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1. Introduction 
 
“The diversification within the international security-political spectrum also has 
to be seen in connection within the light of the new security concept, in which the 
military security is only seen as a component in a broader definition of national 
and international security, which includes economical, social, ethnical, religious, 
national and human aspects.”1 
The 1993 Annual Report by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs paid tribute to the diversification 
of the understanding of security. Security and security related studies have changed 
significantly since the Cold War, when the bipolar world order came to an end. It was during 
this time that the Copenhagen School was founded. This theory within the field of Security 
Studies, tries to interpret new developments by integrating components other than the 
traditional security aspect. 
From 1987 until 1995, several events took place which could have been existential threats 
for Austria. Existential threats, which could endanger the survival of a state, are the focus of 
Security Studies. Major events that occurred in this timeframe were the dissolution of the 
communist Eastern Europe, the War in the former Yugoslavia and the Austrian European 
Union (EU) membership and all have a common denominator - Alois Mock. As Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at that time he was very much involved in these events.  
Of these three major events, two are being discussed here: the dissolution of Eastern 
Europe, and Austria’s European Union membership. In the preface of the Annual Report 
from 1987, Alois Mocks states that Austrian foreign policy consists of two pillars. He notes 
that one pillar is European policy, which redefines Austria’s relationship with the European 
Community. Neighborhood policy, in particular relations between East and West, forms the 
second pillar and in this area Austria sees itself in a unique role due to its permanent 
neutrality.2 
                                                          
1
 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 355 (All citations, originally in German, are translated by the author.) 
2 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. XI 
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Based on this statement by Mock, these two pillars are the focus of this thesis. By doing so it 
is not intended to say that the War in the former Yugoslavia is not worth taking a closer look. 
It was a rather unforeseeable event that very much influenced Austria’s secur ity. It could not 
have been crueler and took place at a time when the concept of war crimes on European soil 
was unthinkable. Nevertheless, it would not be possible to cover the time of the War in 
former Yugoslavia in a decent manner, which this dark chapter in European history actually 
deserves.  
The common denominator, from an Austrian point of view, is Alois Mock. He was a politician 
in recent Austrian history. He has not often been referred to as an important figure. Hardly 
any books and articles have been published about him or his active years as a politician. His 
dedication to work for Austria’s interest, especially during his time as Foreign Minister, and 
his ability as mediator brought him some prominence on the international stage, especially 
in the Balkans. To achieve much more on international level (maybe a prestigious job in an  
international organization) would have been possible for him if it was not for his Parkinson’s 
disease.3 This illness forced him to resign as Foreign Minister, and it made him incapable to 
take on new challenges. 
 
1.1 Hypothesis 
The central question, which is discussed in this work, is: Were the two events - the 
dissolution of Eastern Europe with a special focus on Hungary, and the Austrian membership 
to the European Union - framed as security issues through an act of securitization? Was the 
securitization successful according to the definitions by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, who 
are the founders of the concept of securitization? 
What is not intended to be discussed here is, whether Austria’s security was ever really 
threatened during this time. As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue it is not possible to say if 
a state’s security is really at stake, since there are no parameters to measure such a ‘real’ 
threat.4  
                                                          
3
 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 263 
4 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 30 
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In order to be able to deal with the great variety of information provided here, the work is 
separated in three parts. The first part is dedicated to Mock’s life and his becoming the 
Foreign Minister, the role for which he is known. Because his time as Foreign Minister is 
important for the understanding of the context, his international career will also be 
emphasized. The second section deals with the dissolution of Eastern Europe and Austria’s 
EU membership. It is intended to describe how these were viewed by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, and what its reaction was. The third part then deals with Security Studies in 
general and elaborates the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization before it is 
applied to the two concrete issues broadly discussed earlier.  
 
1.2 Method  
From a methodical point of view, a great part of this work is based on primary literature such 
as the Annual Reports by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s 
Security, A New Framework of Analysis, in which they founded the so called Copenhagen 
School. The reports by the Foreign Ministry are very useful as they portray the different 
events from the Ministry’s point of view. Additionally, they provide background information. 
The reports are all published in German, therefore a translation of the original text is more 
appropriate as literature on this issue in English is either not published by the Ministry or 
already one step away from its original text. All of these translations are made by the author. 
Additionally, original texts such as the memoranda and notes on the Foreign Ministry’s 
official position as well as memos for briefings for Foreign Minister Mock concerning EU 
membership. Speeches by Alois Mock, which he gave in Parliament, provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the issues. A personal interview with Mock was not 
possible, so it was very helpful to fall back to previous interviews with him. 
In addition to primary literature, secondary literature is used. This includes books which have 
been published by people who were either involved in the processes (as members of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in some way) or by people that were very close connected to 
Alois Mock during his time as Foreign Minister. This literature provides an inclusive view of 
the time that is being discussed, as well as valuable ‘behind the scenes’ information.  
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Discussions with people from Mock’s hometown Euratsfeld were helpful5 in developing a 
deeper understanding of who he was as a person. None of this information is used in the 
following text though. Rather it is useful background knowledge.  
The thesis first presents the relevant historic events before it goes on to elaborate the 
theory. Through a theoretical lens it then tries to answer the hypothesis of whether Austria 
was successfully securitized or not. This order is chosen to support a better understanding of 
the complex issues and follows a logical structure. With the knowledge of what happened in 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1995, one is better equipped to 
understand the further work.  
 
1.3 Structure 
The first chapter of this work deals with Alois Mock on a personal level. The biography in the 
beginning provides an impression of the person Alois Mock, and attempts to not focus on his 
political background exclusively. Background knowledge can be helpful for a better 
understanding of the context. In the case of Alois Mock it also helps to understand why he 
became the kind of politician he is still known to be.  
The second part is a detailed report on Austro-Hungarian relations with a focus on the time 
period from 1987 until 1995. Since the transformation in Hungary cannot be explained 
without at least some knowledge of the dissolution of Eastern Europe in general, the whole 
transformation process is also tackled. This overview is provided in order to be able to 
understand where Hungary stood when Mock started his career as Foreign Minister in 1987, 
and how it had been formed by 20th century events.  
The chapter The Quest for European Union Membership provides extensive insight into the 
time period when Austria applied for membership to the EC,6 as well as providing a glance at 
the time previous to the 1989 application. The focus though is set on the period in time 
                                                          
5 These discussions were rather informal. I also grew up in Euratsfeld and went to school there so it was easy to 
talk to people that either knew Mock as a child, or to those who worked with him when he was mayor in his 
hometown. He still has family in Euratsfeld so he never lost touch with his roots. 
6
 The name European Communities (EC) is the used term for the time from 1958 (the Treaty of Rome) until 
1993 (when the Treaty on European Union entered into force). This Treaty created the European Union (EU) 
and is therefore the used term from 1993 onwards.  
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when Alois Mock was Foreign Minister. It concludes with the successful referendum, and the 
resulting EU membership.  
The final chapter deals with the field of Security Studies. An overview of the development of 
the subfield of International Relations is provided and the two leading theories within 
Security Studies—realism and liberalism—are elaborated. Following that, the Copenhagen 
School and its concept of securitization are explained. This concept is then used to help 
analyze the two historic events, which were discussed earlier in order to determine whether 
these events had been successfully securitized by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.  
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2. Alois Mock 
 
Alois Mock was perhaps one of the most important and dedicated Foreign Ministers in 
contemporary Austrian history (1987-1995). During his time in office he led the country 
through difficult decisions that had to be made, and through events which changed Austria 
and its foreign policy forever. In a 1994 interview he told the interviewer that he kept telling 
himself: “You had a lot of luck in your political career, you had tremendous political chances 
and you took use of them.”7 He was the longest serving Foreign Minister in the history of the 
Second Republic of Austria and his eight year term included significant changes for Austria; 
some of those were predictable whereas others came as a surprise even to people closely 
involved with foreign policy.  
This part of my thesis tries to provide some insight to Alois Mock as a person focusing on his 
time in office as Austria’s Foreign Minister from 1987 until 1995. It will seek to address his 
aforementioned statement; that is, whether he really made use of the opportunities 
presented to him during his time in office. Therefore, two significant political changes are 
looked at more closely – the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Austria’s becoming a member 
of the European Union. 
 
2.1 Biography  
Alois Mock was born on 10 June 1934 in Euratsfeld, a small, typical Austrian village in Lower 
Austria close to Amstetten. His father, whom Mock was named after, had a fatal motorbike 
accident shortly before his first son was born. Mock’s mother Mathilda was left alone with a 
deeply in debt dairy business that she founded together with her husband after they were 
married in 1933. August Mock (Mathilda’s brother-in-law) supported the young widow, and 
they were married in 1936; five more children followed.  
Alois Mock was born during troubled times; Engelbert Dollfuß, Austria’s authoritarian 
chancellor at the time, was killed by the Nazis just a few weeks after Mock’s birth, then in 
                                                          
7 Wachter 1994, p. 23 
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1938 the National Socialists occupied Austria.8 Both of these events directly influenced 
Mock’s family since they opposed the National Socialists. These developments were also the 
reason why the family had to give up their dairy business. Against his wife’s wishes August 
Mock became a candidate for membership in the Nazi Party and by doing so they were able 
to start a transport company. However, after the war this led to complications in that August 
Mock was not able to lead his business for several months because he was involved with the 
Nazi Party as a candidate during the war. So Mathilda Mock acquired a driving license and 
kept the company afloat, which was rather uncommon for a woman at that time.9 Looking at 
his childhood one can see how these experiences shaped Mock as a person and a politician. 
Another factor that influenced Mock significantly was his education. He went to the 
Volksschule (elementary school) in Euratsfeld. After that he attended the Hauptschule 
(middle school) for two years, before he was sent to the Gymnasium (high school) in 
Amstetten. Among his classmates in the Hauptschule he stood out as a very good student 
and a bright pupil and because of this he was transferred to the Gymnasium. There his life 
became difficult. Not only was the distance he had to walk to school every day – about ten 
kilometers by foot – excessive, but his teachers and classmates gave him a hard time. That 
was reason enough for his parents to put him into a boarding school in Seitenstetten.10 Also 
a Gymnasium, but led by Benedictine monks, this boarding school was a much better 
environment for Mock and allowed him to explore and cultivate his interests and provided  
numerous opportunities for him to develop as a person.  
After his graduation from the Gymnasium a new period of Mock’s life started, the life of a 
student in Vienna. All of his friends from the Gymnasium had enrolled to study law and 
although Mock had always planned to study international trade and get a job within the 
export field,11 he nevertheless succumbed to peer pressure and enrolled to study law at the 
University of Vienna.12  
                                                          
8 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16 
9 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16 
10 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16f 
11
 Wachter 1994, p. 39 
12 Wachter 1994, p. 40 
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Through the company of these colleagues he had become involved with and joined the 
student fraternity Norica13.14 This group’s membership included some notable ÖVP 15 
politicians, such as Leopold Figl (Austria’s first chancellor after the Second World War) and 
Julius Raab (Austrian Chancellor from 1953-1961). The late Franz König (Archbishop of 
Vienna) was an honorary member, and most recently Norica’s Michael Spindelegger who 
was appointed Foreign Minister in 2008 and has been Vice Chancellor since 2011. 16 The 
fraternity was a perfect match for Mock since they shared similar Catholic and political 
views.17 In some sense the student fraternity became a political nurturing ground for Mock; 
not only did he get to meet well known and insightful politicians during his time at 
university, but also became involved in the representative student bodies of the university. 18 
Within this organization he was also active during the crisis in Hungary in 1956,19 founding a 
committee that would organize and collect basic goods for the Hungarian refugees.20 In June 
1957 Mock finished his law studies. Only during the final semesters of his studies he learned 
topics that were of great interest to him, specifically economic history, constitutional law 
and international law. He once mentioned that studying law was not such a bad idea after all 
knowing that he might have chosen a whole different career in the field of international 
trade.21  
                                                          
13 Norica is a member of the ÖCV (Österreichischer Cartellverband), the Austrian catholic student organization.  
14 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 19 
15 The ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) is Austria’s Christian democratic and conservative political party.  
16 Norica, http://norica.org/geschichte  
17 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 20 
18 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 20 
19
 The revolution in Hungary from 23 October to 4 November in 1956 broke out after students from the 
Technical University in Budapest requested changes concerning the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Hungary. These demands included for example free elections, a multi-party system, a new government and 
distraction of the Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. A lot of other Hungarians felt sympathy for the students’ 
requests and joined the movement. After civil war-like days in Budapest the revolution was ended with the use 
of military force by the Soviets. What followed were years of Soviet suppression.  A lot of Hungarians fled from 
their home country; most of these refugees’ first stop was Austria.  
20
 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 23 
21 Wachter 1994, p. 40 
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Following his graduation from university, Mock was admitted to study at John Hopkins 
University in Bologna, Italy. Because he had received a scholarship from the Austrian 
Ministry of Education to study in Italy, during the Christmas break in 1957 he was asked to 
talk about his first experiences in Bologna.22 After a short talk with the head of the 
department for scholarships, he was introduced to Heinrich Drimmel,23 who was the 
Minister of Education (ÖVP) at the time. He offered Mock a position with the Ministry.24 At 
first, Mock had no interest in accepting this job offer or in becoming a civil servant, and 
rather wanted to go back to Bologna and finish his studies.25 Although he was not sure 
whether it was the right choice, he nevertheless accepted a position as consultant for the 
exchanges of professors and students on 1 February 1958.26 His experience studying abroad 
and his knowledge of English and Italian made him an ideal candidate for this job. It was also 
at the end of 1958 that he got to meet his future wife Edith Partik, who applied for a 
scholarship to study History and English in London.27  
After some time, Mock felt the urge to study abroad once again and to learn French. He was 
offered scholarships to study in Nancy, France and at the College d’Europe in Ghent, 
Belgium, however he turned both opportunities down after the Ministry insisted that they 
did not want him to leave.28 Nevertheless, he did not give up, and applied for yet another 
scholarship in Brussels in 1960, where he was also accepted. This time he was not going to 
miss the opportunity, though the decision to go to Brussels cost him his job as a consultant. 
Mock then took one of the next trains and went to Brussels to start his studies at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles.29  
                                                          
22 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24 
23 Heinrich Drimmel was Minister for Education from 1954 to 1964. 
24 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24 
25
 Wachter 1994, p. 33 
26 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24 
27 Wachter 1994, p. 52 
28
 Wachter 1994, p. 33 
29 Wachter 1994, p. 34 
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Back in Vienna, after living abroad for half a year, he worked for the Federal Chancellery as a 
consultant in the Department for Economic Coordination. Much of Mock’s work in the 
Federal Chancellery required him to collaborate with the Austrian national representatives 
of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)30 and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA)31 and other such organizations.32  
In 1962, Alois Mock started working at the Austrian OECD-Mission in Paris a much coveted 
job which many young men attempted to get. Thomas Klestil, President of Austria from 1992 
until 2004, was working with him in Paris at the time and had described the job as a 
possibility to improve someone’s knowledge of French, get to know the customs of 
international conferences, and learn about the rules of international politics and 
diplomacy.33  
Mock worked and lived in Paris for four years and it was during this time abroad that he 
married his wife Edith in 1963. They became engaged after she graduated from university to 
become a high school teacher in History and English, but it was not until after the wedding 
that Edith moved to Paris to live with her husband.34 
Carl Bobleter, Alois Mock’s boss at the OECD-Mission in Paris, changed jobs in 1964 to 
become the secretary for the new Chancellor, Josef Klaus. It was also Bobleter who 
mentioned Mock’s name when Klaus was looking for a second secretary.35 In the spring of 
1965, Mock moved back to Vienna and switched jobs with Michael Graff. Mock took over his 
job as second secretary in Vienna, whereas Graff took Mock’s position in Paris.36 This was 
not the only time that the career paths of these two young men would cross.   
                                                          
30
 The OEEC was the predecessor of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
which was founded in 1948 and renamed in 1961. 
31 The EFTA is a free trade organization in Europe, which was founded in 1960.  
32
 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 25 
33 Klestil 1997, p. 13 
34 Wachter 1994, p. 64 
35
 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p.26 
36 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 27 
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In 1966, Klaus’ head of the Federal Chancellery, Franz Karasek, quit his job and the 
Chancellor was looking for a qualified person to take over the vacancy. He was especially 
impressed by Mock’s work effort, straight forwardness, and lifestyle.37 That was reason 
enough for him to ask Mock if he was interested in this job. Even though Mock was not quite 
sure whether to take the opportunity or not, he accepted the offer in the end.38 In this 
position he functioned as a link between the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry. Despite 
accepting the position, he always kept the idea of starting a diplomatic career in the back of 
his mind. 
It was not until 1966 that Mock became an official member of the ÖVP – the Austrian 
People’s Party.39 Up to this point, his career seems even more impressive for people who are 
familiar with the Austrian party system. During this period people typically belonged to the 
ÖVP or the SPÖ – the Socialist Party; in fact, your work place and your status often indicated 
which party you belonged to. Therefore, it is rather surprising that a person with no official 
party membership got as far as Mock did, however his supporters did not care about these 
formalities, but instead appreciated his work effort. It is also important to note that his 
association with the student fraternity Norica characterized the political setting he felt most 
comfortable in. 
While Mock carried out his new job as head of the Federal Chancellory, he continued to seek 
a career as a diplomat. In order to become a member of the Austrian diplomatic staff one 
has to pass a test, the so-called examen préalable. He prepared for this rather difficult test 
while working a full time job and passed it flawlessly, an outstanding achievement, and thus 
became a civil servant within the Foreign Ministry; however, he did not give up his job in the 
Federal Chancellery.40  
In 1969, the ÖVP formed the Ausschuss für Internationale Beziehungen (a committee for 
international relations), of which Alois Mock became a member next to Foreign Minister 
                                                          
37 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 27 
38 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 28 
39
 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 31 
40 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 30 
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Kurt Waldheim.41 This committee was put in charge of dealing with three developments, the 
first of which was to regulate relations with the European Economic Community (EEC).42 The 
second was to bring the deal with South Tyrol43 to an end and, the third, to work on the 
Chancellor’s policy regarding Eastern Europe.44 Two of these three fields - the EEC and 
Eastern Europe - would not only be significant  during this specific time, but these would be 
two major fields Mock would have to deal with again during his time in office as Foreign 
Minister. At that early point in his career he worked on the diplomatic foundations of these 
matters thus gaining useful knowledge. 
The year 1969 was a major cornerstone in Mock’s career when he was unexpectedly made 
Federal Minister of Education; he was at least as caught by surprise by this development as 
were other people who were very close to him. The ÖVP had formed a majority government 
after the elections in 1966, the first majority government in the Second Republic after a 
series of grand coalition governments since 1945. The ÖVP received 48.35%45 of the votes, 
which was 5.79% more than the SPÖ, who came in on second place. Shortly after forming 
the government in 1966, polls indicated that the upcoming elections in 1970 were not going 
to turn out too good for the ÖVP. There were a lot of disputes within the ÖVP itself, which 
made voters turn their back on the party.46 Additionally, a dispute over a proposed school 
reform broke out The Minister of Education at the time was Theodor Piffl-Perčevid, who was 
in favor of adding another compulsory school year at the Gymnasium before graduation, 
                                                          
41
 Kurt Waldheim was Minister of Foreign Affairs for the ÖVP from 1968 until 1970. He later became the 4
th
 
Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 until 1981. After that, he was the Federal President of 
Austria for one period from 1986 until 1992.  
42
 Austria pursued an agreement with the ECC. This agreement should grant Austria a special status in the 
relation with the ECC and was intended to eliminate tariffs and abandon import restrictions. This issue will be 
tackled in more detail later on. (See Meier-Walser 1988, p. 194; cf. Kapitel V: Die Bemühungen Österreichs um 
ein Abkommen mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft p. 197-242.) 
43 In 1969 an agreement between Austria and Italy was signed that once again (after the Gruber – De Gasperi 
Agreement from 1946) redefined the autonomy status of South Tyrol. (cf. Kapitel VI: Die Südtirolfrage in Meier-
Walser 1988, p. 243-291.) 
44
 Eichtinger und Wohnout 2008, p. 30 
45
 Voting results 1966: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/NRW_1966.aspx 
46
 The authenticity of Chancellor Klaus was questioned; an increase of taxes on wine, a fee after an acquisition 
of a car and the great loss of voters at the local elections in Vienna in April 1969 did have a negative effect on 
the party’s polls.  
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however, others within the ÖVP did not agree. In fact, a significant number of party 
members who formed the voter base were also not in favor of Piffl- Perčevid’s advocated 
change. This lack of support became obvious after a petition for a referendum was held. 47  
Piffl-Perčevid let the party choose – either they back the reform or he would to resign. The 
consensus was against the reform and thus against Piffl-Perčevid, or at least that was how he 
interpreted the process; in the end Theodor Piffl-Perčevid resigned despite being asked to 
stay on.48  
That Mock filled a position for which he had not been the first choice seems to be typical for 
his career. He often was not among the favorite candidates; he rather seemed to be the 
perfect compromise. That, at least, is the impression one gets from a recent book about 
Mock by Eichtinger and Wohnout. When Piffl-Perčevid left, his position as minister needed 
to be filled. Klaus’ first choice was Josef Krainer, an up-and-coming young man from Styria, 
but he rejected the offer. The second choice was Professor Hans Tuppy, for whom Klaus 
could not find enough supporters. It was Hermann Withalm who suggested Alois Mock for 
the first time on 29 May 1969 and Klaus soon became a strong supporter of this idea that 
Mock would fill the vacant post. When Mock was nominated he was about to turn 35, very 
young indeed in Austrian politics, so it did not come as a surprise that his nomination caused 
skepticism in the Austrian media landscape.49 It was no secret that he was not the party’s 
first choice. So the media was unsure whether it was Mock’s qualifications that helped him 
get this job or if it was his friendship with the Chancellor. All this uncertainty did not create 
the best environment for the beginning of a new chapter in Mock’s life.50 On 2 June 1969, 
Mock was inaugurated by the Austrian President Franz Jonas; however, his term only lasted 
approximately ten months. 
In his short term as Federal Minister of Education he dedicated a lot of effort to university 
policy. He also fought for better and more opportunities for educating children on the 
countryside. Mock gave his first speech as the new Minister of Education in Parliament on 10 
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July, 1969. His fiery speech caught the Chancellor’s attention, and it became obvious that 
Klaus had taken Mock under his wings.51 The new Minister of Education represented the 
contemporary circumstances much better than his predecessor, who had been very old 
fashioned. Mock was, as Eichtinger and Wohnout put it, “a modern and reform-oriented 
conservative,”52 who more or less allowed a smooth transformation within this sector 
between Piffl-Perčevid and Leopold Gratz from the SPÖ.  
As previously mentioned Mock’s term in office did not last very long and ended with the 
formation of a new government after the 1970 election. This resulted in the SPÖ 53 under 
Bruno Kreisky forming a minority government with the support of the FPÖ54 – the Austrian 
Freedom Party.55 It was not until 1971 that the SPÖ started its phenomenal career as 
majority government after an electoral reform.56 For the ÖVP this meant 17 years of 
opposition.  
During that time Mock held several positions that helped him become the Foreign Minister 
as he is known for. After the formation of a new government in 1970, Mock had to leave his 
office in the ministry, but still held a seat in Parliament. Within his position as a Member of 
Parliament he participated in several working groups, especially as an active member of the 
Foreign Policy Committee.57  
At the same time one important fact became obvious to him: if he wanted to become a 
successful politician one day, he had to build a base of voters that would support him no 
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matter what. The local elections in Lower Austria in 1970 were the perfect opportunity to do 
so. The local ÖVP in his home town Euratsfeld nominated him as mayor, but he did not fill 
this position for the whole five year term. Instead, he resigned in July 1971,58 almost one 
year later, in order to become the leader of the ÖAAB.59 Nevertheless, he was able to build a 
base of voters that supported him throughout his political career. Alois Mock’s hometown 
Euratsfeld took much pride in the politician’s origin and to celebrate his 60th birthday a 
square was named after him.  
That Mock became the head of the ÖAAB was, again, a compromise and definitely nothing 
planned. The organization was torn over the question of who was best suited to be Alfred 
Maleta’s successor as head of the ÖAAB. Two men, Georg Prader and Karl Glaser, were seen 
as the most likely candidates, both of whom could count on their own group of supporters. 60 
However, some time before the ÖAAB elections were held, Prader backed down. He himself 
then brought Alois Mock into the game as a suitable candidate for this position. In the 
beginning it did not look too good for Mock, but he was able to change the atmosphere in 
his favor. In his newly acquired position he was, suddenly back at the top of the party where 
he soon became known as a person that fights and stands for certain values. He was also a 
strong supporter of ‘social responsibility’61 and within the party fought for more flexible 
working hours, especially for women,62 and pursued several other topics that were not that 
popular, even within his own party. 
In 1975, Alois Mock was included among the so called ‘young lions’. They were supposed to 
fight next to ÖVP leader Karl Schleinzer for a better result after the next elections, which 
were to be held on 5 October.63 Unfortunately, everything that had been planned up to that 
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point changed 19 July, when Schleinzer died in a car accident. Since the election was just 
around the corner, a new party leader was desperately needed. In addition to Josef Taus, 
Alois Mock was also seen as a potential candidate and it was not until Mock assured Taus 
that he would not run against him that Taus retained his nomination. Just after Schleinzer’s 
funeral, Taus was formally elected as the new party leader. However, the hoped-for result of 
the elections was not achieved and once again the SPÖ was able to assure a majority.64 It 
became obvious to the ÖVP that the fight of ending the role as opposition had just begun. 
Since Taus did not bring the anticipated form of success for the party, one can assume that it 
did not take too long until his suitability for the position was questioned.  
In 1978, the position of the chairman of the ÖVP parliamentary club needed to be replaced. 
Stephan Koren, the former chairman, was appointed as President of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, the central bank of the Federal Republic of Austria.65 Once again Mock was 
used as a stopgap when it was about time to find a new person for the position of the 
chairman. Nevertheless, this was the last time that he had to fill a gap.66 Josef Taus, the 
party’s chairman, wanted to become chairman of the parliamentary club as well however, 
the sub-organizations of the ÖVP did not share his opinion. Rather they wanted Michael 
Graff to become the new chairman. On top of that, the ÖAAB saw that its time had come to 
finally increase its influence and, therefore, nominated Alois Mock. The most promising 
candidate was definitely Graff, who after all, lost the internal elections. Mock got nine more 
votes than his opponent Graff (57 against 48 votes).67 From this moment on Mock was seen 
as the ÖVP’s new star, and was able to play on the same level as the strong SPÖ. In addition, 
the media shared this feeling and had very high expectations of him. He was already seen as 
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the new party leader.68 For his new job as the chairman of the party’s parliamentary club, 
Mock left his position in the ÖAAB and was succeeded by Herbert Kohlmaier.69 
At first it looked like the duo Taus (chairman of the party) and Mock (new chairman of the 
parliamentary club) would increase the party’s chances in the 1979 elections; however, the 
election ended with the biggest success for the SPÖ with 51%.70 Taus wanted to reform the 
party, but was not given an opportunity to do so and resigned in June 1979, nearly a month 
after the elections.71 
This time the pattern seemed to change; Mock was not a compromise for the position as 
party leader and next to Erhard Busek he was a serious candidate from the very beginning of 
the discussion.72 Busek’s time had not yet come and it would not be until 1991 that he 
became the party’s leader. Interestingly, Alois Mock did not publicly announce that he would 
like to become the new party leader. In fact, he supported Busek until the very last minute 
just before the meeting where he then was officially nominated for this position. Whether 
this was really how he felt or was solely for tactical reasons is unclear. Also during the 
meeting he took a reserved position, an attitude which granted him the approval of other 
top-class politicians towards future reforms. Furthermore, he was able to keep Sixtus Lanner 
as secretary-general, for whom he could not find a major support at first.73 On 7 July 1979, 
Mock was officially elected by party representatives as the new party leader with a majority 
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of 97.5%74 of the votes.75 At this point, he was not only the party’s leader, but the 
parliamentary club’s chairman as well.76  
In the beginning, Mock dedicated most of his work to end the SPÖ’s absolute majority in 
Parliament. He also intended to be the first to begin raising political awareness of certain 
topics. Being thematically ahead of one’s opponent was seen as a key element to success. He 
also wanted to reform his own party, in order for it to appear more united in the eyes of the 
voters. Hence, such a reform was of major interest for him. He once mentioned that the 
party no longer reflected its own ideology, had ceased to debate current affairs, and by the 
1950s it had already lost its drive towards transforming society; as a consequence it had 
become less attractive to potential voters.77  
The first years in his new position can be described as laying necessary ground work. The 
next general elections opened a window of opportunity for the party; in the past thirteen 
years, no poll before an election had been this positive for the ÖVP. The 1983 elections, 
theoretically, allowed a participation of the ÖVP in the government, however the party was 
again left with the role as opposition. Critics might argue that they could not use the 
opportunity in 1983, because the SPÖ was still too strong. A coalition with the FPÖ helped 
them stay in power, even though scandals had started scratching the flawless surface of the 
party under Kreisky. The ÖVP stayed in opposition, but the party under Mock was able to 
move towards ending the SPÖ’s absolute majority government and for the first time was 
able to gain votes (43.2%) since the 1966 elections.78 
After the 1983 elections, Bruno Kreisky resigned and Mock’s strategy became clear. He 
declared the SPÖ as the major opponent, was willing to use all of the party’s resources, and 
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indicated that the FPÖ was not worth it fighting against.79 Mock tried, as is the nature of a 
politician in opposition, to harm the parties in government (particularly the SPÖ) as much as 
possible, especially on topics such as the planned erection of a hydro-electrical power plant 
in Hainburg (Lower Austria), the launching of the already built nuclear power plant in 
Zwentendorf (Lower Austria) and the bankruptcy of state-owned businesses. Right after the 
general elections in 1983, polls saw the ÖVP in front of the SPÖ. However, the mood 
changed again in favor of the SPÖ in 1984 and for the first time while holding this position 
Mock was questioned as party leader.80  
Another topic that attracted domestic attention was the presidential election in 1986. As 
early as in 1981, the ÖVP first considered nominating Kurt Waldheim as a candidate, after it 
became clear that he was not going to be elected as Secretary General of the United Nations 
for a third term.81 It was planned to officially nominate him in the fall of 1985.82 However, 
Waldheim had also talked to the SPÖ because he wanted to see if he could be nominated by 
both parties.83 The SPÖ decided differently though, and nominated the popular Minister of 
Health, Kurt Steyrer.84 The polls indicated that without a question Waldheim would win the 
elections; that was until the Austrian magazine profil published an article about Kurt 
Waldheim’s past during the Second World War. At first, it looked like the ÖVP’s candidate 
would lose the elections, however Michael Graff85 was able to flip the cards in favor of the 
ÖVP and Waldheim won the elections on 8 June after the second ballot with 53.9% of the 
votes.86 
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The so called Waldheim Affair began on 3 March 1986 with the publication of an article in 
the Austrian magazine profil by journalist Hubertus Czernin.87 The article pointed out that 
Waldheim’s autobiography highlighted omissions in Waldheim’s past during the Second 
World War. Information that he had provided before the presidential election regarding his 
role during the war were inaccurate, such as his role in the mounted corps of the SA, and the 
role he played in the Army Corp E in Saloniki, Greece. Later on Waldheim was also accused of 
war crimes. A committee of historians was formed by the Austrian government, in order to 
deal with the accusations. The committee concluded that Waldheim was not involved in any 
war crimes but, he had nevertheless lied about his military record. In 1987, the United States 
of America put Kurt Waldheim on a watch list, which limited his possibilities to visit several 
countries during his presidency and did not allow him to enter the USA.88 
After the presidential elections the changes came thick and fast. Eichtinger and Wohnout 
even describe this time as a political turnaround in Austria that followed the presidential 
election. A day after the elections Fred Sinowatz resigned as SPÖ leader, and Franz Vranitzky 
replaced him in this position. In addition, Jörg Haider was elected as FPÖ leader in 
September, which was reason enough for Vranitzky to end the coalition between the SPÖ 
and FPÖ, and call for elections a year earlier as initially planned.89 
All of a sudden, the political state of affairs in Austria experienced some major changes 
within a very short timeframe. Mock had to deal with two younger, new opponents and that 
created a very different environment for the election campaign. Already in 1984, at the 
celebration of his 50th birthday, Mock was perceived as the future Chancellor after the 1986 
elections. That optimism, though, was hard to find at the end of the campaign.90 The 
campaign had started off well, but a statement by fellow party member Rudolf Sallinger 
pushed the spotlight to possible coalition formations and this caused negative headlines. He 
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said that his party should form a coalition with the SPÖ regardless of the election outcome.91 
This statement only helped the two other parties (SPÖ and FPÖ). One can argue this 
contributed to Mock losing the election. He knew that the election in 1986 would most likely 
be his last chance to become Chancellor and because of this he fought hard to win. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that his personal disappointment was very high at the end of the 
Election Day, when it became obvious that the party would come in second. The fact that 
the SPÖ was only ahead by 1.8% was no consolation. Mock was the party’s representative in 
talks with the SPÖ as well as to the FPÖ regarding the possibility of forming a coalition. It 
quickly became apparent that more supported a coalition with the SPÖ, even though Mock 
suggested one with the FPÖ. He thought that this formation would leave the ÖVP in a better 
position since his party would be the ‘number one’ and as such it would be able to 
implement its political ideas better, rather than being in a subordinate position within a 
coalition.92 Talks with both parties took place, but, as expected, a coalition with the SPÖ was 
formed at the end. 
On 21 January 1987, the new government formed by the SPÖ and ÖVP, was sworn in.93 
During the negotiations, in order to come to a coalition agreement, Mock was able to use his 
experience to get the most for his party. He even received acknowledgment by Vranitzky 
that the ministerial posts would be divided in half between the two parties. He was, 
therefore, able to finally get the ÖVP back in the game, after being out of the political league 
for seventeen years. Mock became Vice-Chancellor, and also managed to become Foreign 
Minister. This meant an extra work load for him, but he was aware that he needed a ministry 
in order to be able to take use of the infrastructure that comes along with it.94 Mock’s time 
as Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs will be outlined later in this work. A focus on his 
career path apart from his ministerial work is, therefore, pursued in this part.  
After the election in 1986, rumors surfaced that the party might be better off with a new 
leader. Its number of voters had decreased again under Mock. It was possible to stop the 
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questioning voices. However, Mock knew exactly that from this moment on, it would be a 
matter of time until he had to vacate his post for somebody else.95 Because there was 
nobody that could follow Mock in his position as party leader, it was argued as to be the only 
reason why a deeper discussion on that matter did not take place.96  
Not only was Mock dealing with problems concerning his role as leader but the coalition was 
also going through troubling times. A final report on President Waldheim’s past, written by 
the commission mentioned earlier, caused serious arguments between the two parties in 
government. Fights about a tax reform in 1988 and the application for membership in the EC 
added up to a less than harmonic relationship.97 On top of that, his Defense Minister Robert 
Lichal was publicly criticized by his own party in 1988,98 and the grand loss of votes at the 
provincial elections in Salzburg, Tyrol and Carinthia in March 1989 added to the problems.99  
However, Mock was not willing to give up that easy. He arranged a party meeting in May, 
which was supposed to be held in June. He used the opportunity there to make it very clear 
that he would run again as party leader.100 However, shortly after that Mock realized that his 
time had come to an end when fellow party members made him confront the truth. So on 
the eve of 17 April 1989, Mock resigned voluntarily as party leader and became 
Ehrenparteiobmann (honorary chairperson)101 of the ÖVP102 but retained his post as Foreign 
Minister of Austria. 
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Mock’s career as party leader ended after 10 years, making him the longest running in this 
position.103 After changes in the government Josef Riegler replaced Mock as Vice Chancellor 
on 24 April 1989 and on 20 May he officially succeeded Mock as party leader.104 From that 
point onwards, Mock was even more dedicated to his duties as Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
However, as time went by, it became obvious that Parkinson’s disease had used up almost 
all of his strength. 
Despite his failing health, Mock never allowed himself time to rest, especially at the end of 
his career as Foreign Minister when negotiations about EU membership came to a close. In 
1995, he resigned as Foreign Minister, and Wolfgang Schüssel took over his position. Until 
1999 he remained a Member of Parliament, but after the elections in 1999 his political 
career ended, mostly due to his illness. Nonetheless, he still tries to participate at as many 
events as his state of health allows him to do.  
 
2.2 Mock’s International Career 
1979 was not only the year in which Mock started his career as party leader, he was also 
elected President of the European Democrat Union (EDU).105 The Union was founded one 
year earlier, and Mock was its President until 1998. In 1983, he was among the founders of 
the International Democratic Union (IDU), in which he also served as President from its 
foundation on until 1987.106 
The EDU was a special platform put together by like-minded parties from EC member 
countries and non EC members. The non EC members profited very much from this 
relationship because they got first hand information about developments in the EC.107 
During the 1980s, one task, among others of the EDU, was to support opposition groups in 
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the Eastern Bloc.108 This also explains the fact that Mock was widely known and appreciated 
among politicians in these countries after 1989. In the middle of the 1990s, the EDU started 
to lose influence as an organization and was absorbed by the European People’s Party in 
2002.109 
Mock’s interest in foreign relations did not form as a result of becoming Foreign Minister in 
1987. It had been an area that caught his interest a long time ago, particularly matters 
relating to European integration. He recalled himself wondering as a student why Europe 
was not a single state similar to the USA.110 His time abroad both studying and while working 
in Paris were also influential. Before he was elected President of the EDU, he was active 
within the European Christian Democrat Workers (EUCDA).111 He had been involved at the 
international stage from an early point on and, therefore, had formed relationships with like-
minded foreign politicians. Mock was able to cultivate relationships that eventually helped 
him, especially before and during the EU membership process.112  
 
2.3 The Foreign Minister from 1987-1995 
As previously mentioned, Alois Mock became Foreign Minister in 1987, after the elections in 
1986 gave his party the opportunity to leave the opposition and form a coalition with the 
SPÖ. At the time he was not only Foreign Minister, but also Vice Chancellor. In addition to 
that, he was party leader until 1989. All of these different jobs created a significant 
workload, which he was only able to manage because of his willingness to sacrifice almost 
anything. Starting in 1989, he was able to focus more on his ministerial post and from that 
point on he did not have to fill as many positions.  
While Alois Mock was Minister for Foreign Affairs, two general elections for the Nationalrat 
(National Council) were held; one in October 1990, and the second in October 1994. At the 
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election in 1994, which was held after EU membership was finalized, he received 46,000 
preferential votes.113 This massive support can be interpreted as a sign of appreciation and 
thanks for Mock’s tireless effort. During both general elections it seemed as if Mock’s 
qualifications as Foreign Minister were never questioned. In addition, he also filled the 
position as Minister of Defense when the actual minister, Robert Lichal, was elected Second 
President of the National Council. Mock was in this position only for a few weeks, starting 
from 6 November until 17 December 1990. Even though he knew that this was a temporary 
task, Mock fulfilled this job with the same dedication and passion as any other.114 One gets 
the impression that he had the ability to unify all sides of the political spectrum and was 
therefore honored and appreciated by a great variety of people for what he did. 
During his time in office, world politics and Austrian politics experienced major changes. The 
end of the Cold War had a significant effect on Austria, since the country was surrounded by 
satellite states of the Soviet regime in the north and east, as did the independence 
movements and the War in the former Yugoslavia in the south, especially the conflict in 
Slovenia. In addition to that, the conflict with South Tyrol had still not been settled, which 
was another issue Mock focused on during his time in office, although this issue was settled 
in 1992. Finally, on 1 January 1995 Austria experienced a historical event, when it became a 
member of the European Union. These events stand out during Alois Mock’s eight year 
position as Austria’s Foreign Minister.115 
                                                          
113 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 262 
114 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 163 
115 Alois Mock is, until today, the person who served the longest time as Austria’s Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in the Second Republic.  
31 
 
3. Austrian Relations with Hungary in 1989 
 
In this section I focus on Austria’s relationship with Hungary and how it changed from 1987 
to 1995, the years that Alois Mock was in office. In 1987, international relations was still 
characterized by a bipolar system, with the USA as the dominant Western actor and the 
USSR dictating actions in the East, and the neutral states of Europe in between the two 
blocs. A situation everyone was used to, but which was absolutely different to what the 
world looked like in 1995. Arguably, Mikhail Gorbachev becoming General Secretary of the 
Communist Party in 1985 would bring about changes; however the sheer enormity and 
extent of these changes were unforeseen. Indeed, the eventual dissolution of the Soviet 
Union significantly altered global dynamics and resulted in alterations of most international 
political relationships, including that of Austria and Hungary, as we shall see.  
Hungary and Austria have been connected by a special bond for a very long time. As part of 
the Habsburg Empire, Hungary was granted special standing in 1867116 and this made the 
country different from other regions of the Empire and in its relationship with Austria. This 
unique relationship is one reason for a closer examination of the case. One might argue that 
a friendly nation, or a country which is not considered hostile, has to go to great lengths for 
an ally to feel threatened or to create a situation which again induces key actors to make a 
security issue out of that particular situation. In fact, the changing international dynamics 
that occurred had the potential to create a threatening environment between Austria and 
Hungary as we shall see in the coming paragraphs. 
This chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which outlines Hungary’s recent history. 
This brief summary is necessary in order to highlight Soviet influence on the country and 
how changes came about at the end of the 1980s. The second part is then dedicated to how 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs perceived the situation, how it dealt with the major changes 
in 1989, and what kind of consequences came out of them. Most of this information will be 
used to analyze whether Austria’s security was actually threatened, or if the situation was 
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perceived as threatening and how the circumstances changed from having a potential threat 
waiting just next door, to eventually building relationships with new democracies after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain. In order to achieve this, a close look is taken at Annual Reports of the 
Foreign Ministry (Jahrbuch der österreichischen Außenpolitik) over a period of the nine years 
from 1987 to 1995117. Additionally, relevant Parliamentary speeches given by Alois Mock are 
included in the examination. How Austria, represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
dealt with the changes at its Eastern border is necessary for a better understanding of the 
theoretical explanation offered in an upcoming chapter when the Copenhagen School’s 
theory of securitization will be applied to how the issues were handled. This theory will be 
elaborated in chapter 5.3.  
 
3.1 Historical Outline of Hungarian History in the 20th Century 
The Treaty of Trianon (1920) reduced the territory of Hungary to 28% of its pre-World War I 
size with only 36% of its citizens remaining there; after the treaty many Hungarians suddenly 
found themselves living in foreign countries.118 The Treaty significantly harmed Hungarian 
national identity and is still a relevant topic in Hungarian politics.  
Before World War II broke out in September 1939, Hungary was already one of Nazi-
Germany and Hitler’s supporters. After the Anschluss of Austria into the Third Reich in 1938, 
Hitler granted Hungary dominion in the territories that it had lost after World War I (Treaty 
of Trianon).119 It was not until the end of World War II that Hungary was occupied by 
German troops after initiating secret negotiations with the Allies. The Hungarians were 
afraid to become occupied by the Red Army and, therefore, turned towards the West. 
Although with little success, since they only were told to negotiate with the Soviets.120 After 
World War II Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops and fell under Soviet rule.  
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Following the war, Hungary found itself in a very difficult situation. While other countries 
were renewing and strengthening their interwar political and party systems, Hungary could 
not as “the political elite and parties in the interwar period had been in favor of the war.”121 
As mentioned earlier, Hungary was occupied by the Red Army in April 1945, which led to the 
fact that the Communist Party was the first party to be reorganized after the war.122 But “out 
of respect towards the western Allies a pluralistic party system was endorsed.”123 
Nevertheless, communists were placed in key positions and slowly took over.  
In November 1945, Hungary had held the first democratic election in its history, and on 1 
February 1946 the country proclaimed itself a republic. A gradual process, also known as 
‘salami tactic’,124 had led towards the unification of the Communist Party and the Social 
Democrats. The proclamation of the People’s Republic of Hungary followed in August 
1949.125 Only one party – the Communist party – was left over at that point. Hungary 
became a satellite state of the Soviet Union with Mátyás Rákosi appointed its new prime 
minister; the country would experience a harsh regime in coming years, in which dissidents 
were prosecuted and killed. The construction of the so-called Iron Curtain also started in 
1949 and lasted until 1963.126 The death of Stalin in 1953, brought with it harsh changes to 
Hungary. Rákosi was forced to leave his position, and was succeeded by Imre Nagy. Nagy 
started enforcing a new way of policymaking, which made him very popular with the 
Hungarian people. However, Nagy did not gain any popularity in his own party and had to 
resign from all positions in March 1955. Rákosi was put back in power, but only for one year 
until he also became too much of a burden for the party.127 Ernő Gerő then took over for 
only three months, right up until the Revolution of 1956. 
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The October 1956 uprising started as a small protest led by students and, quickly escalated 
into a revolution within days, with a significant portion of Budapest’s population taking part. 
This soon led to an invasion by the Red Army. On 22 October 1956, students had published a 
proclamation in which they demanded several political changes. The following day, a protest 
was planned by these students and other people impulsively followed them, expressing their 
support. The protest was spontaneous, far from organized and began to gain momentum. By 
the time the protestors had reached and occupied a radio station in order to publicly 
announce their demands, the first shots were fired; however, it is unclear, by whom – the 
army or the protesting crowd. Either way, the revolution had claimed its first victims. As 
word spread of the revolution, protestors began to gather in other Budapest locations.  At 
one site they took down a statue of Stalin, while elsewhere, people requested that Imre 
Nagy talk to them, as they wanted to see him back in office as Prime Minister. Nagy 
responded the following day, and begged the people to end the violence. Hungary 
experienced other significant changes during this time. Other parties were permitted in 
addition to the Communist party; a new government was formed; and Nagy began 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Now under the leadership of Imre Nagy, Hungary began 
to move towards exiting the Warsaw Pact and becoming a neutral country. Nagy also 
negotiated with the Soviets regarding the departure of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. 
What Nagy and the Hungarian people did not know was that the Soviet Union was in secret 
negotiations with János Kádár,128 whom they intended to return to power after successfully 
reestablishing their dominance in the state. On 4 November, the Red Army began a military 
attack against the revolutionaries, and by the eve of the year 1956, the Soviet Union was 
back in control and it appeared as if the Revolution had never taken place.  
Because of the instability created by the Revolution, many Hungarians had fled with 
approximately 180,000 refugees migrating to Austria.129 Imre Nagy was among those, and 
sought shelter at the Yugoslav Embassy, where he was again betrayed. Although he had 
been granted free passage by Kádár, Nagy was arrested by the Soviets as he left the 
Embassy, and later charged with treason. He was sentenced to death and hanged in June 
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1958, then buried in a mass grave. His execution was intended to serve as a warning to 
leaders in other countries under Soviet influence.  
Kádár eventually changed his policies and later during his rule Hungarians experienced a rise 
in their standard of living and were even allowed to travel. He became an eponym for a very 
specific system called ‘Kádárism’.130 This system tried to find “legitimation not solely through 
political means, but instead through economical, socio-political [means] and social 
welfare.”131 Kádár is to this day perceived by some as one of Hungary’s most successful and 
popular politicians.132  
Later on Kádár changed his policies. He was also the eponym for a very specific system called 
‘Kádárism’.133 This system tried to find “legitimation not solely through political means, but 
instead through economical, socio-political [means] and social welfare.”134 In this time 
Hungarians also experienced a rise of the standard of living and were even allowed to travel. 
Janos Kádár is still until today one of Hungary’s most successful and popular politicians.135 
In the following years the Hungarian economy became more and more unstable. Foreign 
debts had a strong negative influence on the economy as did the international oil crisis, and 
the change of Soviet policy.136 By the middle of the 1980s it became obvious that a 
significant transformation was about to happen, the extent of which was unforeseen. An 
opposition started to form in Hungary, and was even permitted to make public appearances 
in 1987.137 That the Communist Party was in a crisis was undeniable. Kádár had to leave the 
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party and the ongoing process could not be stopped anymore. Historic parties, prohibited 
since 1949, started to reorganize as did other political organizations.138 
Changes in 1989 were substantial, fast and unpredictable. On 2 May the official 
deconstruction of the Iron Curtain began.139 In June, negotiations commenced between the 
Communist Party, a delegation from the opposition, and representatives of different 
organizations. They agreed on how to organize the peaceful transformation of the current 
system, on laws that would amend the constitution, on a different electoral system, and also 
that other parties would finally be permitted.140 In the same month Imre Nagy was reburied, 
and was officially reinstated as the hero of the Revolution of 1956.  
On 19 August 1989, the so called pan-European picnic was held at the Austria-Hungary 
border near the town of Sopron. The border crossing was opened for a couple of hours and 
hundreds of East Germans took advantage of the opportunity to flee into the West, 
unimpeded.141 Clearly, a significant number of East Germans took this as an invitation; on 10 
September the border to Austria was permanently opened for East Germans.142 That 
Hungary let East Germans leave the East, is often referred to as the triggering event in 
history that eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. On 23  October 
1989,143 Hungary was declared a republic and, from that point, the Soviets made no attempt 
to maintain their political and military domination.  
On 25 March and 8 April 1990, the first democratic national elections were held since 1945. 
At this time, Soviet troops were still stationed in Hungary, but this did not have any impact 
on national politics.144 A coalition of conservative parties had formed after the elections. In 
1991, Hungary finally gained full independence for the first time in 47 years, following the 
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dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in February and after the last Soviet soldiers left Hungarian 
soil on 19 June.145 Hungary has since become a stable democracy and has successfully 
bonded with the West after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; in 1999, Hungary became a 
member of NATO and, in 2004, a member of the European Union.  
 
3.2 Hungary’s Relations with Austria  
When referring to the relationship between Austria and Hungary, it is essential to not only 
focus on the two countries. Instead it is important to take a wider perspective on global 
politics in order to be able to understand interactions between the smaller players. The 
1980s can be seen as the decade that brought numerous changes to world politics. In the 
beginning, the world order similar to that during the 1960s and 1970s. The bipolar 
relationship between the two superpowers world dominated almost every aspect of politics 
during this era; if not directly, then via other states that were sometimes reluctantly forced 
to choose an alliance with one or the other. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General 
Secretary of the USSR and ushered in an era of change. Not only within the USSR, but 
globally, the words ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ are intimately connected with him. This new 
way of thinking increased the flexibility and willingness of communist countries in 
international relations to increase their commitment to the resolution of common global 
issues.146 One of these was nuclear disarmament. In 1987, the leaders of the USA and USSR, 
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, signed the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) 
Treaty, which regulated the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.147 
It is a cornerstone in disarmament, which was preceded by years of escalating nuclear 
capabilities, coercive policy and distrust. The hostile relationship which had characterized 
East/West relations for a number of decades had changed into a more amicable one; it had 
become an atmosphere in which successful talks were possible, were followed by 
agreements, and where a growing mutual trust could be observed. 
                                                          
145
 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 147 
146
 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 2 
147 Citation of the INF Treaty, 1987: “…requires destruction of the Parties’ ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5.500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures 
and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force.” 
38 
 
In regard to Austria, the significantly improved relationship between the East and the West 
had an immense effect on the state. This was not only because of Austria’s geographical 
position in Europe, which was partly surrounded by communist states. It was also due to 
Austria’s neutrality, which had been enacted in 1955 by the Austrian Parliament in order to 
end the Allied occupation after World War II. The country saw itself as an important player 
and agent between these blocs and had tried to gain influence through active participation 
in the 1980s in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).148 Austrian 
leaders realized that their influence was limited, however, they also realized that the country 
did not have to play a passive role in international relations; it was up to Austria to pursue an 
active role in international affairs.149  
 
3.2.1 Relations before 1989 
The 1987 Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs illustrates how relations between 
the East and West dominated Austria’s foreign policy at that time. In the report’s preface 
Alois Mock described its neighborhood policy as one of the two pillars of Austrian foreign 
relations.150 This continued for a number of years, until the country’s priorities were slowly 
reordered and the upcoming European Union integration began to dominate the discussion. 
Austrian security policy in 1987 was mostly dictated by global politics. There was little 
possibility that Hungary and Austria could develop a common policy as the two countries 
belonged to different blocs and this significantly limited their options.  
There was no need for Austria to adjust its security policy in 1987 since the situation in terms 
of security and new threats had not changed, between Austria and Hungary compared to the 
past years. Thus, 1987 can rather be seen as a continuation of the policy of the previous 
years, in which the tense atmosphere between the blocs started to be a less stressed one.  
Austria’s security policy in 1987 was primarily focused on fulfilling its neutrality obligation. 
Austria was, according to its declaration of neutrality, obligated to maintain this status - with 
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armed means if necessary. The Annual Report states that a country’s security can only be 
granted when its territory would not become a military vacuum. In order to avoid such a 
situation, the state is obligated to keep its armed forces active.151 The Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs described in its 1987 yearbook that the Austrian armed forces were organized in a 
defensive way. This means that the army was not equipped to carry out extensive offensive 
actions. According to this, Austria was in favor of the idea that a similar situation would be 
created in its surrounding regions (defensive organized armed forces).152 A military vacuum 
would not only decrease Austria’s security, but also its neighbor’s security if the national 
defense would not be modernized and properly equipped. Because of the defensive 
organization the Austrian army did not intend to participate in the armament race. The state 
was much more interested in achieving a balance of power by disarmament on both sides of 
the conflict.153 According to that, Austria was a strong supporter of the achievements that 
were accomplished from that perspective in 1987 (e.g. INF Treaty and ongoing talks on the 
planned Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Agreement).  
As mentioned previously, there was a unique bond between Austria and Hungary. During 
1987, Alois Mock’s first year in office, a number of official and unofficial bilateral visits154 
took place. These visits can again be interpreted as a sign of good relations as can the 
proposal to apply as a common host for a world exhibition in their two capitals, Vienna and 
Budapest in 1995. Also a significant amount of contact economic level took place in order to 
increase the exchange of goods between both nations.155 Hungary became increasingly 
eager to increase the collaboration with economic partners in the West.156  
By 1988, it had become clear that change was on its way. The Annual Report on Foreign 
Relations dedicated an entire chapter to the ongoing transformations in the Eastern Bloc. It 
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predicted that at the end of the century Eastern Europe’s developments and changes would 
be remembered in history.157 The relaxation of tensions between the superpowers, 
especially in international relations, was still going on and both sides were working to keep 
the process alive. The lack of agreement on a reduction of strategic arms (START)158 was, to 
some degree, a setback, but did not seriously harm the long term momentum; talks and 
negations were only delayed and an agreement was finally signed in 1991.  
Austria saw great opportunity in this changing situation, and pursued plans to intensify its 
relationship with the Eastern Bloc countries. It understood that in order to help and support 
the systems’ changes, it was necessary to support the states with initiatives that would 
follow common European interests as well as common European values.159  
In this context, the joint application of Austria and Hungary, as common hosts of the world 
exhibition in 1995 is better understood, and can be interpreted as an intelligent move in 
terms of developing a better relationship and support for Hungary. The title for the 
proposed exhibition was “Bridges to the Future”.160 According to the Austrian Foreign Policy 
Yearbook, “the theme of the exhibition, accords with this political resolve to overcome the 
division of Europe.”161 Furthermore, bridges can easily help to surmount obstacles, such as 
different opinions on political and economical systems. Austria and Hungary were competing 
with Miami/USA and the decision would not be made until 1989.162 The plan in Vienna was 
to ask the city’s people and to let them decide in a referendum whether they would support 
the idea or not. However, the Viennese rejected the idea in the 1991 referendum. 
Unfortunately, the project lost its attractiveness after the fall of the Iron Curtain and, after 
the referendum, was no longer pursued.163  
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There were other signs of a deepening relationship between the two countries. Austrian-
Hungarian relations also registered an increase in export and import of goods in 1988. 
Exports increased by 3% (6.8 bn. öS164) compared to 1987 figures and imports increased by 
3.1% (6.4 bn. öS).165 The increase in trade on both sides was positively affected by the easing 
of regulations for the movement of Hungarians.166 However, as early as in 1979, a bilateral 
agreement between Austria and Hungary had come into force that allowed the citizens of 
both countries to travel to the other country without a visa. This agreement was intended to 
strengthen the friendly ties between the neighbors.167 
As far as Austria’s security policy in 1988 is concerned, much of its focus was on 
disarmament. The Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1988 stated that the 
policy of disarmament was a tool to bring stability to a situation and was necessary in order 
to achieve peaceful order.168 As for nuclear threats in a war, it stated that war stopped being 
the mean of achieving a political aim. The Yearbook further elaborated that “armed forces 
and weaponry serve the prevention of war and not the implementation of political aims.”169 
This interpretation stands in contrast to what Carl von Clausewitz described in his book On 
War. He argued that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means.”170 However the 
published interpretation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1988 seemed to be more 
applicable for this specific time, and in accordance with the understanding of the magnitude 
of a nuclear war. A war in which its weaponry has the ability to extinguish human kind simply 
cannot be a continuation of politics. This was a simple, but very solid reason, why Austria put 
most of its political strength into the discussion of disarmament.  
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For that reason, Austria also applied to become a member of the Conference of 
Disarmament, where it so far only had observer status.171 Austria also suggested hosting an 
international agency in Vienna. This agency was intended to control and observe agreements 
on chemical weapons as a counterpart to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 172 
Austria also supported a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in order to complicate and prevent 
the further development of these types of weapons.173 These are just examples intended to 
emphasize Austria’s dedication to actively supporting the process of disarmament, and to 
highlight its positive input into the developments.174 
The numbers of refugees coming from Hungary seeking asylum in Austria, increased 
significantly in the first four months of 1988, as did the number of refugees from Poland. As 
a consequence, the Ministry of the Interior sped up the process for asylum seekers 
considerably. A total of 15,790 refugees came to Austria during that period: 6,670 came 
from Poland, 2,610 from Hungary and 2,314 from Romania. Only 6,718 cases could be 
closed, but only 1,785 people were approved as refugees. No more than 55 Hungarians 
(2.11% of Hungarians coming to Austria) were granted the status of refugees according to 
the Geneva Refugee Convention.175  
Later on, in the part that is dedicated to the topic of Security Studies, it will  be argued that 
migration can very much put a state’s security at risk. A great number of unexpected 
migrants can influence a state’s perception of its security. Migration is viewed as a non-
traditional threat compared to coercive diplomacy or military threat. It was integrated into 
the concept of Security Studies after the Cold War as a non-traditional security threat.  
In 1988, no specific focus on Austria’s security policy towards Hungary could be found. Most 
of the international developments were dominated by concerns about what the USA and the 
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USSR were doing or were about to do. The relationship in this year was all about the 
common application for the world exhibition and focused more (as the Austrian policy 
intended to) on this common project than on differences. 
 
3.2.2 1989 – Annus Mirabilis 
The events that took place in 1989, how Austria adapted to these circumstances, and what 
challenges lay within Austria’s security policy, will be discussed in this section. The analysis is 
being done from the Ministry for Foreign Affair’s point of view and also forms the center of 
my focus on the Austrian-Hungarian relation. What has been discussed so far on this matter 
was done in order to build up better understanding of this Annus Mirabilis176 in particular, 
and to be able to see how deep and developed the relationship was, which direction it was 
heading, and how the necessary adjustments were handled. 
In 1989, Austria was confronted with a completely altered global situation, a situation that 
had changed virtually overnight. The state was therefore challenged to adapt to this new 
situation fairly quickly. Peaceful revolutions177 in the countries under Soviet influence 
overthrew their governments, and pluralistic and democratic systems started to develop; 
Moscow did not struck back with military force, as it did in Hungary in 1956 and in Prague in 
1968. These new states started their very own and independent systems.  
Even for Mock, things came as a big surprise. He had been interested in Eastern Europe for a 
long time at that point, but the Foreign Minister was at least as astonished by the turn of 
events as many of his colleagues in Europe and the rest of the world were.178 
Even for Mock, things came as a big surprise. By that point he had been interested in Eastern 
Europe for some time, but the Foreign Minister was as astonished by the turn of events as 
many of his colleagues in Europe and the rest of the world were.179 Mock described the 
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changes in Eastern Europe in the preface of the Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs as historic. He stated that the lines and borders, which were drawn in Yalta in 1945, 
were finally erased. At the same time, Mock was well aware of the fact that these young 
democracies had not acquired enough strength at that point in time to actually be self-
sufficient and depended on the West to assist them with their newfound freedom.180 
This support, he wrote, formed one of the cornerstones of Austria’s reaction to the 
tremendous developments in 1989. The Foreign Ministry was also aware of the fact that the 
coming adjustments towards democracy and independence would carry numerous problems 
along with them; therefore, the need to integrate the new states into a common European 
peaceful order was seen as essential.181 In short, sustaining the security at home by 
supporting the new developments with all possible means abroad was part of the ministry’s 
strategy.  
Austria found itself in a new position due to its very good relations based on history and its 
previous engagement in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It took over the role as 
an interceder in the Western world and in Western institutions after 1989. The ministry also 
introduced an innovative idea to ease the entrance of these new democracies into 
organizations like the Council of Europe or EFTA. In addition to that, Austria lobbied in 
Western European states to open up their markets for Eastern European goods.182 Hungary, 
actually, became the first former Warsaw Pact member to apply for a full membership in the 
Council of Europe in November 1989.183 
One effect of the change in East-West circumstances in 1989 that has not been mentioned 
so far was the rapidly increasing number of people leaving the East. The restrictions by the 
Eastern Bloc for traveling to the West were eased, and many people took advantage of this 
and left their homes behind for potentially better circumstances in the West. The number of 
people seeking asylum in 1989 peaked an all time high at 21,882 people (15,790 in 1988).184 
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Although most of them did not qualify as refugees as defined by the Geneva Refugee 
Convention; in Hungary for example, only 31 applicants out of 364 were granted asylum in 
1989. In most cases, the migrants left their homes for economic reasons and not because 
they were afraid or victims of prosecution.185 Therefore, it was seen as a necessity to react to 
these new challenges by opening up new ways of immigration, in accordance with the 
circumstances of the affected countries.186  
The rising number of people migrating and seeking asylum was not viewed as a threat at that 
time though and one of the major concerns was the challenge of the system itself. It was 
designed to only serve a certain number of people, and not the influx it suddenly had to deal 
with. It also meant that an increase of money was spent in order to keep the system running 
and, more importantly, sustaining the care of refugees and asylum seekers.187  
In June 1989, one photo made its way around the world. It captured the Austrian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Alois Mock, and his Hungarian colleague, Gyula Horn, cutting through the 
barbed wires of the Iron Curtain at their border together.188 Their act of ‘removing’ the Iron 
Curtain was symbolic of the destruction of the boundaries between these two countries. It 
signaled to the world the removal of the boundaries between the East and West. This day, 
27 June 1989, is seen as symbolic of Eastern Europe’s liberation from communism189, 
although the actual deconstruction of the Iron Curtain began much earlier, on 2 May 1989 
and by the end of June it was even difficult to find a part of the Iron Curtain that was still 
intact and could be used for a photo.190 
In addition to the symbolic act at the Austrian-Hungarian border191 several measures were 
taken in 1989 on behalf of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The ministry’s focus lay 
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in the common interest to sustain peace and support the new political and societal systems 
in their development.192 By doing so, Austria, and its officials, hoped that the new 
democracies would not regress into some kind of regime or become unstable systems and it 
was these concerns that were a constant threat for Austria and Europe. 
On 9 November 1989,193 Mock gave a speech in the Austrian Parliament, in which he 
presented the “current developments in Easter Europe and the support to these reform 
processes given by Austria.” In this speech he informed Parliament about the new 
developments and gave the Members of Parliament an update on the current situation in 
the East. In addition, he presented findings of how Austria, represented through his ministry, 
planned to address the current conditions. Mock, once again, pointed out Austria’s 
importance in this situation, which was determined by its history, its geographical location, 
and that providing aid for these countries was of vital interest to maintaining the country’s 
own security. Before Mock proposed a course of action, he pointed out the importance of 
economic support for the reform process and described how Austria would give financial 
support based on bilateral relations. In addition to that, Austria would also provide financial 
support together with other European countries under the coordination of the European 
Commission.194   
The following points constitute the course of action the main focus of Austria, as presented 
by the Minister in his speech on 9 November 1989. First, he listed the endorsement of 
agricultural infrastructure in Poland, and added the importance of vocational and 
management training. Mock continued by pointing out that he was asked to encourage 
Austrian companies to engage in joint-ventures in the area of tourism. Another focus was set 
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on promoting investments; agreements with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia had already 
been made and more of these were planned with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The 
fifth point he made concerned financial aid for Poland in terms of debt conversion. In his 
sixth point he spoke about the ease of market access for the new democracies, and 
explained that Hungary had already been granted this access. This meant a reduction of 
customs; he noted that Poland should be given the same status. His seventh suggestion was 
dedicated to the protection of the environment. The Minister pointed out that the fine 
expertise Austria had in this field would open up new possibilities of cooperation, which 
should also be supported with financial aid. Mock concluded by explaining that closer 
scientific, technological and cultural collaboration could bring a great benefit for everyone 
involved in that project. In accordance with this last remark, Mock also mentioned the 
development of cultural institutes, which could help to improve the understanding for 
Austria in Eastern Europe.195 
Many of the measures that Mock presented in this speech were not carried out by the 
ministry itself. A number of them were handled in collaboration with the aid that was under 
the European Commission’s coordination. This aid was mainly dedicated to benefit Poland 
and Hungary. Austria’s share was primarily focused on food supply, educational training and 
trade improvements among others.196 
Mock also mentioned the eased custom regulations between Hungary and Austria in his 
speech. The positive effects of these became visible in the increase of trade between the 
two countries. Austrian exports increased by 27.1% in 1989 compared to 1988 and imports 
from Hungary increased by 23.1%.197 In comparison to other countries, Hungary had the 
highest import rate to Austria, followed by increases of 11.3%,198 in Czechoslovakia 6.7%199 
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in Romania and 2.7% in Poland. Austria’s export rate to Hungary was only second highest 
after Poland (+40.7%).200 
The actions that are described in the following paragraphs are not a complete 
representation of every measure that was carried out at that point in time, but does include 
the Quadragonale, new Austrian representations in the Eastern countries, Austrian libraries 
and the engagement in education. These actions provide a better understanding of how 
much Austria was involved in that field. In addition, it demonstrates how great its interest 
was to provide aid to the new democracies. 
Quadragonale 
The Quadragonale, also known as the Initiative of Four, was established on 11 November 
1989 as an informal forum by Italy, Austria, Hungary and the Social Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in Budapest. In March 1989, the groundwork for the initiative was laid by Mock 
and the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister, Péter Medgyessy.201 After the Quadragonale 
incorporated Czechoslovakia in its circle, it renamed itself and was called Pentagonale for 
some time. Today the forum is known as the Central European Initiative (CEI). In 2009, the 
CEI stated that the foundation of the Quadragonale had a double objective. One was 
political, and the other one was economic. The political goal was to “give a clear sign of 
overcoming the division in blocks.” The economic objective was a “gradual homogenization 
of the socio-economic structure of the member countries.”202 In the Yearbook of 1989 
another ambitious goal can be found, namely, that its cooperation should form an 
opportunity of newfound quality in relations among European states.203  
The Quadragonale started its collaboration between the four founding countries with no 
organizational structure and without a codified base. This was representative of its informal 
and pragmatic character.204 Projects which the designated working groups of the initiative 
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were to deal with in 1989 included transport, telecommunication and information, 
environmental protection, cultural collaboration and the collaboration of small and medium-
sized enterprises.205 The Quadragonale attracted other countries as well and began to 
expand. Today the CEI has eighteen active members and after an institutional 
transformation it is now a project oriented organization.206 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland also started a separate collaboration in the Visegrád 
Group (also referred to as V4 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993). The group was 
founded in 1991, “to regain full sovereignty, remove the last traces of totalitarianism, create 
viable democratic structures and a working market economy and make coordinated steps 
towards their integration into European organizations.”207  
 
New Austrian Representations 
In the developing democracies in the East, new Austrian representations were opening up. 
This was done in order to pay tribute to the already existing good relations, and to forge an 
improvement of these.208 By doing so, Austria ensured it would not miss out on having a very 
good basis of understanding with the new states right from the very beginning.  
Austrian Libraries 
As already mentioned, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had a significant amount of interest in 
increasing the appreciation of each other’s cultures. Culture and history were elements 
often seen as common denominators between Austria, its neighbors and other states that 
were previously under Soviet influence, therefore, the Austrian libraries project was strongly 
encouraged. The concept had been launched earlier, but was enlarged after the revolutions 
in 1989. The new libraries were dedicated to offering books by Austrian authors. A lot of 
these books were banned due to censorship during the regime in the Eastern Bloc.209 The 
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libraries also provided copies of books in their native German language. Today, 53 of these 
Austrian libraries, which were of significant interest to Alois Mock, are still in existence.210 
Austrian Engagement in Education 
In order to increase cultural understanding of the country, not only were Austrian libraries 
established, but also Austrian schools and kindergartens. However, they were not founded 
right away in 1989 as the realization of such projects takes time and careful planning, but by 
1990, an Austrian High School in Budapest began teaching.211 Only one year later a school 
opened its gates to pupils in Prague.212 In addition to that, Austrian teachers were sent to 
teach in schools in Central and Eastern Europe. As a former Minister of Education it is 
expected that Mock would be interested in positive developments in this field.213 
As stated earlier, support for the development towards new and functioning democracies in 
the East and especially in the neighboring countries, were of major interest for the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the examples provided illustrate Austria’s interest. They also indicate 
the fast pace with which Austria reacted to the new situation. It was not passive, waiting for 
change, but became a very active player in the process and participated in it with as many 
activities as possible. Informal gatherings and the foundation of the CEI demonstrated 
Austria’s ability to adapt. In addition to that, the idea to support the education of people in 
the new democracies by both opening up schools and sending well trained teachers to these 
countries, was not only a noble, but also a strategic and intelligent course to pursue; the 
necessity of well educated citizens was seen and supported, not only through educational 
institutions, but through access to books in the Austrian libraries.  
As for Austria’s security, 1989 was definitely a change, but the reactions to the changes were 
not as much of a discontinuation as one would expect. Relations were intensified and the 
fields of cooperation were extended. From today’s point of view one could argue whether 
there had been a better way of dealing with this situation or not. It is also clear today, 
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though, that Austria’s security had not been seriously threatened at any time during or after 
the reform process in 1989. Even later, Austria did not experience a real threat by the new 
countries. It is clear that the provided support for the new democracies was a positive 
reaction to the developments.  
In regard to relations between Austria and Hungary, as mentioned earlier the conception of 
the CEI was launched by Mock and Medgyessy together. Even though the CEI is still active 
today, the Visegrád group is more significant to Hungary. It is said that Mock was especially 
attracted to support initiatives, which were examples of the democratic Western sphere, 
and helped to undermine the communist regime in Eastern Europe. 214 
A number of the engagements mentioned previously were pursued because of Alois Mock’s 
personal commitment and his dedication to the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It was also important to give them a real chance to catch up to advances in Western 
Europe. Eichtinger, Mock’s personal assistant for several years, wrote in his speech that was 
given in honor of Mock’s 70th birthday, that his boss often referred to his mentor Josef Klaus 
in that context. Klaus, in front of the Council of Europe in 1965, was quoted to have said that 
the architects of the House of Europe cannot forget that this house actually, next to a façade 
and a west wing, must have an east wing.215  
 
3.2.3 The years following the Annus Mirabilis 
In 1990, the first consequences of economic mismanagement of former Soviet influence 
became obvious; the impact that the centrally planned economy had on these countries was 
disastrous. Not only was the socio-political backwardness visible and needed to get closer to 
Western standards, 216 but as Mock noted in the preface of the 1990 Annual Report, the 
need for their economies to catch up was undeniable.   
Of the former Soviet countries Hungary, Poland and later on Czechoslovakia performed best 
in the process of adapting to systemic changes after the 1989 revolution. Hungary held 
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parliamentary elections on 25 March and 8 April 1990 and in November it became the first 
permanent member in the Council of Europe. At this early stage in its newfound 
independence, a full membership in the European Community was an explicit goal of 
Hungarian foreign policy.217 Hungary was often referred to as a model of a successful and 
fast systemic change. 
Austria and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs continued to be involved in the bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives that were formed in 1989. The main focus of aid was multilateral 
support. This support was diverse, covering humanitarian assistance, technical support and 
additional financial aid and included consultation and a range of educational 
endowments.218 The list of support offered by Austria to the new democracies is extensive 
and could be continued, however it is not the intention of this thesis to provide a full 
accounting of what assistance was supplied, but rather to indicate the level of commitment 
the country had towards the successful democratization of the former Soviet states. In 
addition to this, Austria continued, and extended its bilateral engagements, discussed 
previously.  
Austria was also involved on multilateral basis. It participated in a number of actions among 
the G-24 and the CEI (at this point known as Pentagonale). The G-24 was a group put 
together by the members of the EC, EFTA as well as the USA, Canada, Japan, Turkey, 
Australia and New Zealand. The G-24 provided financial and economic aid under the 
European Commission’s coordination. In the beginning the idea was to assist Poland and 
Hungary in particular, but soon the Group’s work was extended to other reforming countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Funding, though, was only distributed when strict criteria 
were met: the recipient country must have taken action to convert their economy to a free 
market system, in addition to adopting actions towards converting its political systems in 
terms of pluralistic democracies, rule of law and respect of human rights.219 The support of 
the G-24 was coordinated with other institutions and groups (World Bank, IMF, OSCE, 
Council of Europe, Economic Commission for Europe, IEA and Paris Club) in order to avoid 
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duplicated actions.220 The G-24’s engagement was based on three different levels. The first 
one, the major point of interest, was direct support of the economic transformation process 
in the recipient countries. It was followed by measures of technical nature concerning food 
and agriculture and concluded with the coordination between reforming countries, the IMF 
and other international financial institutes.221 Austria’s share of aid money within the G-24 
was 3.7% in 1990 out of its total.222 
In 1990, Poland had also declared an interest in a membership to the CEI, however its initial 
interest was informal and the country was not able to join until the summer of 1991.  Also in 
1990, it began to function on a working group basis. In addition to the existing groups, new 
projects (such as energy, tourism and migration problems) were added to the work load of 
the group.223  
As noted earlier, after the revolutions in 1989 the unexpected and increasing numbers of 
migrants seeking better opportunities abroad became a progressively more urgent matter 
that needed to be dealt with immediately. In 1990, a total of 22,789 migrants had entered 
Austria, although on the positive side the number of asylum seekers from Hungary (44) and 
Poland (132) had decreased. In accordance with the political changes, even less were 
actually granted asylum (Hungary: 0, Poland: 1). Most of the refugees were either from 
Romania, or from other developing countries.224 Due to the rising number from Romania, 
visas were reintroduced for Romanians although visas had not been necessary since 1969. 225 
However, this reintroduction caused many Romanians to migrate to Austria illegally via 
Hungary where they did not require a visa. To gain better control over the situation, 
surveillance began at the Hungarian border, with the assistance of the Austrian army. Visas 
were also reintroduced for citizens from Poland and the Soviet Union226 as it had become 
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obvious that the number of immigrants from those countries increased. Neither state had 
been able to successfully start the process of democratization; additionally, the economic 
situation had not improved (e.g. Romania). Others that had introduced these elements 
(Hungary and Czechoslovakia) had an enormous amount of people traveling to Austria, but 
these always returned back home. They had a place that was worth going back to as 227 their 
home country provided them with options and opportunities.  
In its Report the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, therefore recommended that the cooperation 
between the Western and Eastern countries had to increase in regard to economic and 
technical aid. In addition to that, the process of democratization required support. Arguably, 
people from democracies with stable economies would not feel the need to leave their 
homes and immigrate illegally to Western Europe. The ministry also argued that 
international standards for asylum procedures should be introduced. This would provide a 
balanced refugee policy among the effect states.228 A common policy on migration for 
immigrants from the East was seen as a possible long term solution to successfully deal with 
this matter.229 
Most of the new democracies held elections after the Annus Mirabilis. The democratic and 
pluralistic systems settled and strengthened themselves. The Ministry for Foreign Affair’s 
policy followed the ideas that were started earlier with great intensity. As in the years 
before, bilateral help was provided as well as multilateral.  
The aid and measures were taken to a higher level of organization in 1991. The economic 
backwardness that became obvious in Central- and Eastern European countries was still 
striking. Consequently, most of the support was provided to prevent the development of a 
“Counter-Europe” in the East. An area of economic misery and political instability could also 
have enormous and negative consequences for Western Europe.230 The standard of living 
sank as a result of the underdeveloped economies and this led to the increase of migrants. In 
its 1991 Yearbook the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, published a list of reasons, why it was of 
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such great importance to Austria that the East was provided with a substantial amount of 
aid. This list included: the return of investments (the markets in the East were seen as very 
promising, once they were to catch up with the West), environment (nuclear power plants 
were particularly seen as a threat), and migration movements (economic help had to lead to 
a rise of the standard of living so people in these countries were given a real opportunities). 
The list concluded by noting the democratic and humanitarian aspect (engagement of the 
West would have the effect that people started believing in common moral values such as 
freedom, democracy and social balance rather than doubting these values when they felt 
excluded by a society that was built upon these values).231 
In terms of Hungary’s relationship with Austria, the new democracy became one of the most 
important partners from both a political and economic perspective in 1991. After the Federal 
Republic of Germany Austria was Hungary’s most significant commercial partner. Hungary 
was also Austria’s major partner among the former members of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON). On the political side, numerous visits from Hungarian 
officials to Austria and vice versa nourished relations between the countries. Additional 
check points at the border also permitted an increase in bilateral border crossings.232 In 
1991, Hungary was also able to move towards increased cooperation with the West when it 
signed, an Association Agreement with the EC on 16 December 1991, along with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia.233 This Agreement came in force on 1 February 1994, and covered “trade-
related issues, political dialogue, legal approximation and other areas of co-operation, 
including industry, environment, transport and customs and aims at progressively 
establishing a free-trade area between the EU and Hungary.”234 
The process that started in 1991 continued in 1992, however it was a shift in the importance 
of issues that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had to deal with. A shift that was, not 
surprisingly, in favor of the EC integration process of Austria, and away from other issues. In 
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1989 the foundation of new democracies in Eastern Europe was the priority. 
Democratization and the development of free market economy structures were the 
dominating factors in 1990. But in 1992, the focus of Austria’s attention was dedicated to 
the membership negotiations with the EC. Not only does the index in the Yearbooks of the 
ministry indicate this shift, it is also visible in the size that is dedicated to either topic. 
Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe in 1992 was still a major concern. It was seen 
as Austria’s duty to be engaged in these new democracies in order to integrate them in a 
free market world economy and to secure social peace. Nevertheless, the membership 
negotiations also required significant resources.235  
Austria’s engagement was not something broadly discussed; it was obvious that the 
assistance, which had started some years ago, continued more or less by itself. The main 
interest was in neighboring countries and over time an interdependent neighborhood policy 
was created.236 Therefore, the areas Austria had been engaged in since 1989 were still 
pursued. Out of these, Hungary always stood out whether portrayed as a successful 
transformation from a communist regime into a country with a functional pluralistic 
democracy, or as a working economy after introducing free market values. This might also be 
a major reason why Austrian politicians never got tired of mentioning the relations Austria 
had with this model country; as it saw itself being in large part responsible for Hungary’s 
success. 
In 1992 a reduction of the number of asylum seekers was registered for the first time. It is 
incorrect to say that migration in total was less than the years before, as only the number of 
asylum seekers had decreased (to 16,238).237 Instead, the number of refugees fleeing from 
the Balkans increased dramatically. Due to the tragic conflict that began there in 1991,  
66,500 refugees238 from the area fled to Austria.239 Austria was still convinced that Western 
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Europe had to deal with the matter of refugees on a common basis and saw a need to 
harmonize the right of asylum on formal and material base. This was interpreted as a 
necessity in order to be able to act more efficiently on the matter. Only then would small 
country like Austria be able to adequately address the problem presented by asylum seekers 
and refugees.240 
In the years from 1993 to 1995, the decline of importance that once was focused on the 
Central- and Eastern European region was again visible. Nevertheless, the Austrian 
engagement in this region was never questioned. The aid was supported by the idea of 
international solidarity and also by the conviction that it was a major component of Austrian 
Foreign policy and one of Austria’s neighborhood policies in particular.241 
The transformation process the neighboring countries had to go through was not seen as 
finished, but rather as an ongoing development. The past years also brought a different 
understanding of what neighborhood policy was. Before 1989, it was a policy that identified 
the relationship between two different political blocs and covered cooperation on all levels, 
including collaboration between different national governments, parliaments, interest 
groups and so on.242  
In 1993, a reorganization of aid, provided by the G-24, began. One year earlier, in 1992, first 
critical voices started to voice concerns about international aid that had been started by the 
global community (e.g. G-24). They called them insufficient and that these engagements 
were not thought through.243 However, the aid continued and in 1993 the G-24 decided to 
only meet at the foreign minister level if it was truly necessary, whereas previously they met 
at least once a year. In accordance with this development, several working groups broke up, 
and the number of meetings below the level of foreign ministers declined. Instead, meetings 
were held in the new democracies so they would feel responsible for their own 
development.244 Until 1995, working groups continued to disband; the process that started 
                                                          
240 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 492 
241 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 163 
242 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. XIII 
243
 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 15 
244 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 158f 
58 
 
in 1989 was still pursued, but was significantly reduced. In the period from 1990 to 1994 
Austria provided 5.04% of the total aid that was given by the G-24,245 which is a rather high 
percentage compared to Austria’s size.  
The CEI started attracting more and more members to its group. For Central- and Eastern 
European countries it presented an attractive alternative to the EU, to which membership at 
this point was out of reach. Besides EU membership another organization that offered the 
possibility of tight cooperation with Western Europe was the Council of Europe.246 The CEI 
was still based on working groups, which continued their work as intended in 1989. Only 
their fields of action had expanded over the years. After Austria became a member of the 
EU, the CEI also became an instrument to coordinate activities between CEI members and 
the European Commission, especially during the Eastern Enlargement of the EU.247  
By 1992, the number of asylum seekers had dropped. It hit an all time low during Alois 
Mock’s time in office in 1993, with a total of 4,744248 and only increased a little249 in the 
following years (1994: 5.082, 1995: 5.920).250 These numbers, though, should not create the 
impression that the problem concerning asylum seekers, refugees and migrants was solved. 
In the contemporary context, a workable, mutually agreeable solution in the EU has not yet 
been worked out, with the lack of cooperation from the member states forming a significant 
part of the problem. However, Mock persistently tried to find a solution at the EU level.  
According to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, bilateral cooperation with Eastern European 
countries was going to be focused on only a few of countries (including Albania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Czech Republic). In addition to that, 
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Austria would focus on different fields, which included the following sectors: economy, 
energy, small and medium-sized companies, work and civil service.251  
Despite the changes, Hungary remained one of the countries that received Austrian aid and 
this again demonstrates the bond between the neighboring countries. In the last two and a 
half years of Mock’s time in office, Austria further enhanced its relations with Hungary. It did 
so with the Auslandskulturpolitik (International Cultural Policy). Auslandskulturpolitik was a 
tool of Austrian foreign policy that promoted Austrian culture in other countries that would 
theoretically bring the country closer to the international community.252 Because of this, 
Auslandskulturpolitik activities expanded in Central- and Eastern Europe after the system 
changes.  
These enhanced activities were also seen as a support for these countries to some degree. 
They only had limited budgets, and often suffered from nonexistent infrastructure that could 
not support culture and science. So it was the Ministry for Foreign Affair’s ambitious goal to 
reinstate old ties, based on the exchange of art, literature and theater, film, science, 
research and technology, as well as education and sport. Some of the actions mentioned 
earlier, such as Austrian libraries and also teacher exchanges fall under the category of 
Auslandskulturpolitik. Also in this context the relationship between Austria and Hungary was 
a special one. The Austrian schools that opened up in Budapest after 1989 became very well 
known for good education; as well, until the negative referendum the work on the 
application for the world exhibition, which Austria had pursued, could also be seen as a part 
of the Auslandskulturpolitik.  
 
3.3 Summary 
In conclusion the relationship that Austria had with Hungary, represented by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, can be described as a rather good one. This can also be said for Austria’s 
other neighbors, including the Soviet Union and Poland. As discussed in this chapter, the 
nature of the relationship between these countries was very much based on the common 
history many of the countries shared, particularly Hungary and Austria. Another positive 
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consequence was that Austria continually pursued the goal of mutual wellbeing and never 
let Hungary and others down; throughout the post-World War II period, including the 
changes after 1945 (the change of the political systems and the redrawing of borders), it 
maintained a fundamental relationship. During this period Austria’s neutrality was a great 
advantage as the Republic was free to associate with any member of the bloc, an 
opportunity it made use of.  
Also during and after 1989, and the Annus Mirabilis, Austria became very active once again. 
Alois Mock contributed a lot to these successful changes. He pursued the idea to guide the 
new democracies to a point of no return,253 where regressing back into communism, or any 
other form of an undemocratic system, would no longer be thinkable.254 Mock himself was 
devoted to promoting the development of democratic and pluralistic political systems in 
these new countries. For him these were big steps towards stabilizing the countries and 
bringing a previously unimagined form of security to Europe, and the world.  
This was the key reason why Mock supported the involvement of the new democracies with 
European institutions and organizations such as the EC and the Council of Europe, and why 
he launched the CEI with colleagues in neighboring countries.255 Mock was quoted as saying 
that he saw being an honest broker of membership of the states of Central- and Eastern 
Europe to the European Union as his life-task.256 
Alois Mock was also personally very devoted to supporting the changes. In fact, before the 
events in 1989, he made a point of meeting with dissidents whenever he was on an official 
state visit. In July 1987, for example, he visited Prague. Based on Mock’s request, a meeting 
with Václav Havel was organized. Mock was the first Foreign Minister ever to ask for such a 
meeting. Although the meeting never made it on the official schedule, he nevertheless was 
the first in a series to meet with a dissident, and it soon became a kind of a ritual for him as 
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well as for other official visitors to meet with dissidents.257 His habit of meeting with 
dissidents was not done solely for personal interest; by doing so he was paying tribute to the 
dissidents’ work.258 He wanted to give a sign to those people – a sign that intended to say, 
you have not been forgotten by the ‘free western world’.259 
The peaceful engagements, that Austria was involved in after 1989, can be seen as a 
respectful way of treating and supporting the new partners. Along the way they were never 
seen as a threat and were treated as such. Everything that happened was on a friendly, 
diplomatic basis, which can be seen in the cooperation with Hungary, as laid out in this 
chapter. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was never afraid of any kind of military threat, and 
did not take a single action that indicated the use of its own military means. This indicates 
how deep the relations with Hungary were, as well as how much the countries trusted each 
other; otherwise a meeting of Mock and Horn, to take down the Iron Curtain, might not have 
been possible.  
Alois Mock’s engagement in this region, in supporting the process of democratization, added 
tremendously to Austria’s credit.260 Also the new start in these relationships, which were 
very much formed by Mock’s principals and visions, made him become one of the most 
distinguished politicians in Austria’s post-war history in the eyes of his country’s citizens.261 
How much Mock’s personality, his character and his personal devotion concerning that issue 
were relevant, is a very interesting question indeed. In addition to that, it would be 
interesting to analyze whether the same outcome could have been achieved if another 
person with a different attitude and different point of view were in the position of Mock. But 
this question cannot be answered shortly and would require a different discussion.  
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4. The Quest for European Union Membership 
 
Here I highlight Austria’s approach to becoming a full member of the European Union, and 
its relationship with the European Community. Some people argue that Austria gaining EU 
membership was Mock’s passion, and a goal, finally realized in 1995, that he had worked 
towards the entire time he was in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs.262 This is the 
accomplishment that he remains best known for and will always be connected with and it is 
difficult to discuss Austria’s foreign policy during Mock’s time in office without referring to 
his role in the negotiations. In fact, Mister Europe is the hard earned nickname that he was 
given after the EU membership negotiations were concluded. 
 
4.1 It all began with the ECSC… 
The development from the beginning of the European Union up to the time when Austria 
became a permanent member in 1995 is not particularly significant to this thesis, however, a 
short outline will be given to provide context to some of the events.  
What began in 1950 as a vision presented by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, 
was in part realized with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1952. At the time coal and steel were necessary elements of the warfare industry. The 
agreement between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands was 
intended to facilitate the scrutiny of each other’s production of these materials. The ECSC’s 
original raison d’être was to prevent another disaster such as World War II in Europe by 
monitoring each other’s economic activities. This foundation of mutual trust, a basic feature 
of the ECSC, also allowed further for developments. These included the 1957 signing of the 
Treaties of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community), by the six countries, which came into force in 1958. The enthusiastic 
early years, were defined by change and the willingness to cooperate closely, was previously 
unimagined; however it was followed by a period of stagnation.  The 1965 empty chair 
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crisis263 signaled an all time low in cooperation, but was resolved by the 1966 Luxembourg 
compromise.264  
Over the next twenty years significant changes took place including several rounds of 
enlargement (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom followed in 1973, Greece in 1981, 
Spain and Portugal in 1986). In 1979, the citizens of the member countries, for the first time, 
were asked to elect the Members of the European Parliament. However, it was not until 
1987, that the Single European Act (SEA) came into force and brought with it widespread 
reform. In fact, the SEA can be seen as the groundwork for even deeper integration in the 
early 1990s.  
In 1991/1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and came into force in 1993. Also known as 
the Treaty on European Union, it was considered the most important step in European 
integration after the creation of the three Communities in 1952/58. Thus the European 
Union, with its much discussed three pillar structure, was established. This was also the 
status quo when Austria became a member of the Union along with Finland and Sweden in 
1995.265  
One has to keep in mind Austria’s political situation when the first steps of European 
integration were made in the early 1950s.  Austria still had not regained full sovereignty 
since the Second World War. Even after 1955, with the signing of the State Treaty, 
membership seemed far out of Austria’s reach.266 This was due to the obligation created by 
Austria’s neutrality status. Membership in the European project was seen as incompatible 
with neutrality and, therefore, the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
was much more feasible, as it was seen as compatible with Austria’s neutrality. This was due 
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to it being a looser organization compared to the EC. Austria was a founding member of 
EFTA and this role helped the country to develop skills which were later useful in negotiating 
with the EC, particularly when these two organizations expressed mutual interest in 
cooperation. For that reason, it is important to first take a closer look at the development of 
EFTA before one can discuss the issue that developed during Alois Mock’s first term in office 
– membership in the European Community.  
 
4.2 The European Free Trade Association 
The EFTA was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. As the organization states on its website, the 
foundation of EFTA was seen as a counterpart to the newly founded EEC, “as an economic 
counterbalance to the more politically driven EEC.”267 It was also argued that “*c+ompared to 
the EEC, EFTA was a much looser organization based on a free trade area and not on a 
customs union.”268 Since three out of the seven founding members were neutral countries, 
and as such either could not or were not interested in giving away any of their political 
sovereignty. Even though Austria thought about full membership to the ECSC at this point in 
time, it strongly believed that the signatory states of the State Treaty of 1955 (especially the 
Soviet Union) would not allow such a membership. It was considered that they would see it 
as incompatible with the neutrality status. EFTA membership was, therefore, a welcomed 
opportunity to save what was left to save and to avoid trade discrimination of non EEC 
states.269  
Strengthening of economic activity, assurance of full employment, increase of productivity, 
rational exploitation of resources, financial stability, and improvement of the standard of 
living, as well as fair competition and elimination of trade restrictions were among the goals 
defined by the founding treaty, which was signed on 4 January 1960.270 With some EFTA 
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members leaving and others joining the association,271 it was obvious from the beginning 
that a tight collaboration with the EC was the goal to work towards. In the early 1970s 
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland and Portugal made such an attempt and held bilateral 
negotiations on free trade agreements with the EC. These agreements ensured that by 1977 
“duties on virtually all trade in industrial productions between EFTA and the EC were 
eliminated.”272 
The so-called Luxembourg Declaration was the outcome of a ministerial level meeting 
between the EFTA and the EC in April 1984.273 This meeting was significant for both sides. 
Subsequently it led to the negotiations on the European Economic Area (EEA).274 
In 1985, however, the European Council decided that the implementation of the Internal 
Market would be the main focus of attention for now, and should be realized by 1992.275 
This put the further development of the EEA on hold and thereafter the EFTA dedicated its 
work to develop a joint position. This joint position should then be used for further 
negotiations with the EC Commission on the EEA.276 Despite this in 1988 the Foreign Ministry 
foresaw that “*a+pparantely neither bilateral nor multilateral negotiations held jointly with 
other EFTA countries can enable outsiders to catch up with the dynamics of events in the EC 
itself” and stated that “*f+or this very reason, the option of EC membership has become 
particularly relevant for Austria in 1988.”277 
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In 1989, the head of governments of EFTA members met, in order to discuss the future 
relationship with the EC. This was the point when Austria took a final decision. After the 
meeting it decided that only a full membership to the European Community would make it 
possible to fully participate in the Internal Market. The developments towards a realization 
of the EEA were seen as too vague. It was even doubted whether an implementation of the 
EEA would ever happen at all. Austria saw a better future in a full EC membership. 278 But 
until this status would be achieved, it continued to stand loyal by the EFTA’s side and met all 
its obligations as a member.279 Austria even stated that it would support the EFTA in the 
future without any reservations280 in a report that was issued on the relations to the EC in 
1988.281 
From that point forward Austria’s main focus was on EC membership. Nevertheless, it did 
not miss the negotiations that followed in the early 1990s concerning the Single Market 
between the EFTA and the EC, as these were negotiations Austria could profile itself in. The 
realization of the Single Market was seen as a preliminary stage to eventual EC membership 
and therefore considered important.282 An agreement between the Council of Ministers and 
EFTA-Ministers could be reached on the creation of the EEA in October 1991. The main 
reasons for the delay of the agreement were differences on two major subjects. These were 
related to the fisheries (special concerns by Norway and Iceland) and transit (Austria and 
Switzerland). The Agreement on the European Economic Area was not signed until 2 May 
1992 though, as the EC Court of Justice considered it to be incompatible with EC law. 
Adjustments needed to be made283 and on 1 January 1994 the agreement finally came into 
force. It had weaknesses, which Austria was only willing to accept temporary. As a result, 
exclusive membership in the European Union became more and more important. The EEA 
integrated Austria to a large extent. In its Annual Report the Foreign Ministry states that “*i+t 
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is therefore a welcome preparation for full membership of the EU, but it cannot be regarded 
as an alternative.”284 Being only a member of the EEA meant that the country was not able 
to participate in the common agricultural policy, the customs union and the European 
Economic and Monetary Union285 and, most importantly, it was left out in the decision-
making process of the EC. 
Although the EEA was initially designed to act as a brake in the enlargement process of the 
EC, it all of a sudden became its motor. The EC could no longer deny that those EFTA 
members, which also applied for a membership in the EC (Austria, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden), shared the same political, economic and social culture. The applicants would not 
be a burden to the EC, but would only strengthen the European Community by its 
membership, as Alois Mock stated.286 The EC was out of arguments on why to deny these 
countries access to its circle. 
 
4.3 The European Community & Austria before 1987 
As was previously mentioned, the idea of EC membership was not something that suddenly 
emerged in Austria in the 1980s, or with Alois Mock becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
The idea had been around for quite some time. However, it was never pursued since 
membership was widely considered to be in conflict with Austria’s neutrality.  
As early as 1956, two politicians (Karl Stürgkh, Member of Parliament for the ÖVP, and Karl 
Czernetz, Member of Parliament for the SPÖ) suggested that Austria should think about a 
membership in the ECSC.287 In October of 1956 the government openly debated a possible 
membership and considered it to be a serious option. However, the announced membership 
application was withdrawn after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November 1956.288  
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But it was not until 1961, only one year after the founding of the EFTA, that Austria, along 
with Sweden and Switzerland, filed an application for an association treaty. The three 
countries were bound through their common neutrality status. While the application was 
not filed collectively, with each single state submitting its own application; the wording of 
the application letters was nevertheless coordinated.289 At this time Bruno Kreisky was 
Austria’s Foreign Minister and due to his position (not solely but still) responsible for the 
application of becoming an associated member. This fact is interesting when one looks at 
the time Kreisky was Chancellor during the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. In these 
years hardly any constructive steps towards EC integration were made and the focus of 
foreign policy at that time revolved around different issues. In 1963, the applications for 
association treaties by Sweden and Switzerland were suspended “whereas Austria continued 
its efforts to reach an agreement with the EEC. The reason for this can be seen in the 
strengthening of the ‘reformist’ wing in the ÖVP which stressed the importance of the 
relations with Western Europe.”290 
The time between the application for association in 1961 and the actual application for 
membership in 1989 was characterized by several ups and downs. It was often influenced by 
other political events that had nothing to do with the relationship between the EEC and 
Austria. One of the negative turn of events occurred in 1966, when the Soviet Union’s 
President Nikolai Podgorny was in Austria. He was asked about his opinion on Austria’s 
efforts towards the EEC. At this point Podgorny’s ‘no’ to any form of association could not 
have been clearer.291 
After Sweden’s and Switzerland’s suspension of their applications for an association treaty, 
Austria pursued an Alleingang (going-it-alone). Exploratory negotiations took place, but in 
1967, a dispute over South Tyrol between Austria and Italy put the talks on hold until the 
South Tyrol question was resolved in 1969.292 By this point in time Alois Mock was already a 
member of Chancellor Klaus’ cabinet. He was able to watch the rather unsuccessful 
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approach to the EC first hand.293 Later on Austria’s Chancellor Bruno Kreisky “asked for a 
complete abolition of customs and tariffs for industrial goods. He did not ask for a far-
reaching association agreement as in the 1960s; the reason being the experience with the 
Alleingang and the misgivings of the Socialists about too close relations with the EC.” 294 
Finally a free trade agreement was signed between EFTA-countries with the EEC and the 
ECSC in July 1972.295 
The attempt to achieve a special status was consistently pursued. Consequently, it proved to 
be helpful to have good relations with other parties on an international level.296 The 1960s 
were a time the EC was preoccupied with issues such as De Gaulle and the empty chair crisis 
noted earlier. After Georges Pompidou became the new President of France, a different 
political style became evident, which evoked hopes in Austria once again. During Pompidou’s 
visit to Austria in November 1967,297 he did not miss the chance to comment on the 
relations between Austria and the EC. His comment on the matter did not leave any room 
for speculation; Pompidou stated that a close relation between Austria and Brussels was 
anything but realistic.298 
After this evaluation of the situation by Pompidou, it seemed as if no progress concerning 
the relationship between Austria and the EC had been made. As Mock argued in his book, 
the reason for this could be found in the policy Austria followed in the 1970s and early 
1980s, a time during which the SPÖ was the only party in the government and was accused 
of having different foreign policy objectives.299 In fact, Austria was very much engaged in the 
Middle East and in the Third World during these years.  
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In the early 1980s, the European Community yet again became an important issue. It was 
considered a topic in which the ÖVP could take over the role as leader. In 1984 the party 
eventually published a manifesto, in which it described Austria as being a part of Western 
Europe. The EC was interpreted as a community to which Austria had to come back to, and 
where it had to find its place in the integration process.300 In the same year the chairman of 
the JVP,301 Othmar Karas, argued that the option of membership in the long run could not be 
ruled out any longer.302 The only person in favor of a membership from the SPÖ seemed to 
be Peter Jankowitsch. Because he pursued this opinion, he received a lot of criticism from his 
fellow party members. Also in 1984, he argued that Austrian participation in the European 
Community could be a possibility.303 The criticism he earned at that time, though, faded 
away very soon and resistance within the SPÖ became less over the following years.304  
In 1985, the ÖVP was in favor of membership. The FPÖ was as well, and had openly declared 
this position and thus was the first party in Austria’s history to include EU membership in its 
party’s platform.305 It should be mentioned that as early as in 1964 the FPÖ supported active 
participation in the EEC. In the close national cooperation and the European way of thinking 
it saw the opportunity to create security for Austrian citizens and argued (not only due to 
economic reasons) for Austrian EEC participation. In December 1985, the ÖVP made a 
motion for a resolution for a comprehensive integration policy of Austria. Even though the 
FPÖ was also pro Europe, the motion was defeated by all parties in Parliament.306  
In the 1986 national election campaign the EC was not an issue that was broadly discussed. It 
was more of an untouched topic at that time. However, there were exceptions and even 
though these were minor they are still worth being mentioned. On the ÖVP’s side it was 
Robert Graf, who stated that a ‘no’ on the membership question was no longer an option. To 
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pursue this kind of policy any longer would have serious negative consequences for Austria’s 
economy, and there was too much at stake. Peter Jankowitsch argued on the SPÖ’s side that 
all possibilities for a close collaboration with the Community must be tapped to its fullest 
potential.307 
This was the state of affairs of the relations in regard to the EC and Austria when Alois Mock 
became Foreign Minister in 1987. A grand coalition government was formed between the 
SPÖ and ÖVP in 1987 and in general full membership was still not seen as an option. The 
Soviet Union was opposed to Austria joining the EC. Despite that, the changing situation, in 
Europe’s East and a relaxation of the relations between the two blocs had positive effects on 
the USSR’s opinion on the matter after all. However, what was of importance at this point 
was that Graf and Jankowitsch supported the idea of cooperation with the EC. It showed 
that a common realization had emerged on both of the powerful political sides and 
according to this realization a membership in the EC had to be the highest priority for Austria 
over the long term.  
 
4.4 The European Community & Austria from 1987 until the application in 1989 
1987 started off with a new government in office and a new coalition agreement. Franz 
Vranitzky was Chancellor and Alois Mock filled two positions - he was Vice Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister. A new global atmosphere marked by cooperation instead of confrontation, 
the election in Austria in 1986, and the reinstallation of the grand coalition, made a new 
quantitative start of the Republic’s integration towards the EC at the turn of the year 
1986/1987 possible.308 
Vranitzky presented the new government and the coalition agreement to Parliament on 28 
January 1987. Among a variety of other issues, the EC had an important place. He argued in 
his speech that Austria needed to follow the dynamics of the EC. Furthermore, Austria had 
to coordinate its actions with EFTA partners if it wanted to make a serious effort in the 
integration process. The new government, therefore, decided to work together with the 
EFTA on the realization of the homogenous European Market. The Chancellor added that the 
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extension of the relationship between Austria and the EC was of great concern for Austrian 
foreign policy. One thing Vranitzky did not neglect to mention was the consequences a 
disruption of Austria’s relation with the EC could have, not only from an economic point of 
view, but also for the Austrian society as a whole.309 Even though the EC issue was not 
something broadly discussed during the election campaign, the political elite were already 
convinced of the importance of the EC. In addition, good relations with the Communities 
were regarded as essential.  
On the basis of this speech given by Vranitzky, in which he presented the government’s point 
of view on the EC issue, it is remarkable to see that this opinion had entirely changed by the 
end of 1987.  
On 3 February 1987, a Working Group for European Integration was created following a 
decision by the council of ministers. The creation of such a working group was already 
mentioned in the coalition agreement. It was established to determine which consequences 
possible steps towards integration in terms of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, 
capital, services, and people) would have. Furthermore, the group would work on 
recommendations and present its findings in a report.310 For this purpose, the working group 
was put together by representatives from all ministries with the exception of the Defense 
Ministry. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank, social partners, the Federation of Austrian 
Industries and liaison officials of the Federal States participated in the working group as well. 
Technically, all fields that would be affected by Austrian integration policy were represented 
by this group, which also kept close contact with Parliament.311 Additionally the working 
group was instructed to take a comparative stock of the EC regulations and the Austrian 
legal situation. The intention behind this was to get a serious estimate of how long it would 
take to harmonize Austria’s laws with the laws of the EC.312 Later on, this specific group was 
also responsible for the actual membership application.  
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Reacting to an interpellation by the FPÖ, Mock stated in Parliament in March 1987, that full 
membership in the EC was not an option for Austria at this point in time. Nevertheless, he 
issued instructions addressed to all ambassadors in EC countries to engage in favor of a full 
participation of Austria in the Single Market.313 
The first sign of change on the matter of EC membership on political level occurred in 
November, 1987. During a meeting of the governors of Austria’s Federal States,314 the 
participants opted for full membership in the EC. With this decision the governors requested 
Austrian membership in the Single Market, with the ultimate goal of full membership in the 
EC as soon as possible.315 Earlier, in May 1987, EC membership was demanded by the 
Federation of Austrian Industrialists. This request followed the claim of a study conducted by 
Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer316 that EC membership “would be compatible 
with Austria’s neutrality.”317 At the end of the same year, the Federal Chamber of Commerce 
also joined the group of EC membership advocates.318 
The governors’ statement, as Mock described it in his book, had immediate consequences on 
that matter.319 It was not only that Mock adopted a different opinion, it also affected the 
council of ministers. The Foreign Minister presented the council of ministers a paper on “the 
concept of Austrian integration policy and outcomes so far on the realization” on 1 
December 1987. This concept also included the option that an EC accession was not ruled 
out any longer, but only if as long as precautionary measures for the future were made 
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regarding Austria’s neutrality.320 Clearly, the option of full membership to the EC turned into 
Austria’s integration policy goal.321 
Reasons for the growing ambition for accession to the EC were diverse. Besides the fact that 
all countries of the EC were able to record economic growth, the EC successfully brought 
peace to a continent which had a long history of war and violent conflict. In addition to that, 
the promotion of democracy and the promotion of human rights by the EC also had 
influenced this change.322 Some might even argue that these factors (democracy and human 
rights) were necessary to begin with, in order to achieve long term economic growth. The 
motives for a closer relationship with the EC were not solely of defensive nature, but were 
positive elements as well. The defensive rationale was the fear that Austria could experience 
discrimination or disengagement if it would not work towards EC membership. In this 
context Manfred Scheich323 also described a growing feeling that a slow but steady political 
marginalization of the EC’s non-EC neighbours took place on international level and in 
international bodies, while the EC’s international power rose.324 The positive driven 
consequences were seen as the increase of Austria’s economic competitive position, since it 
would have to deal with (worldwide) competitors.325 
The global approach was a concept developed by Manfred Scheich at the end of 1986. It 
influenced all of the fields described above. In it Scheich argued that a comprehensive 
approach to the relationship between Austria and the EC is more desirable than dealing with 
selected points. To only deal with punctual solutions, was the approach endorsed by the 
Luxembourg Declaration, but not seen as useful when a reduction of discrimination, 
respectively a full membership in the Internal Market, was aspired.326 The goal of the global 
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approach was defined as the participation in the Internal Market, which should lead to a 
greater deregulation and openness of Austria’s economy. This intention was included in the 
coalition agreement, and Vranitzky also mentioned it in his speech in Parliament in January 
1987. Even though full membership in the EC was deliberately not mentioned as a goal, but 
instead seen as an option, the accession-train was put on the tracks and ready to leave, as 
Scheich described it metaphorically.327 Also the establishment of the Working Group for 
European Integration has to be seen as part of the concept of this global approach. The 
revised opinion on EC membership at the end of 1987 is one of the outcomes of this 
concept.  
1987 was not only a benchmark for Austria’s EC policy, but also for the EC itself. The Single 
European Act came into force, in which the Internal Market was clearly defined for the first 
time. In addition, a date was set on the realization of the Internal Market; by the end of 1992 
it should be accomplished with its requisite four freedoms (free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital).328  
So far, Austria’s potential EC membership was officially only mentioned as an option. But in 
March 1988 both Vranitzky and Mock took a firm stance on that matter. It is interesting to 
note that, although full membership in the EC was not ruled out any longer by March 1988, 
it was not until the beginning of April 1989 that the SPÖ officially decided to support a 
membership application. Before that the SPÖ was rather reluctant to take any actions in 
favor of membership. The ÖVP representatives already did so at a meeting in January 
1988.329  
Chancellor Vranitzky and Vice Chancellor Mock met in March 1988, as they always used to 
do right before meetings of the council of ministers, and compared their information they 
had on the EC issue. From the information provided they concluded that from that time 
                                                          
327 Scheich 2005, p. 34 
328
 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 123 
329 Scheich 2005, p. 65 
76 
 
forth accession to the EC was the ultimate target and that participation in just the Single 
Market with EFTA was not enough anymore.330  
Reasons for the fundamental change of Vranitzky and Mock’s opinion were diverse, but all 
led back to the thought that whatever was about to be created and institutionalized by the 
EC could not be missed by Austria. Up to this point in time, cooperation with EFTA-partners 
had been very useful, but it had become obvious that EFTA was not able to keep up and 
compete with the EC.331 One reason why negotiations between the EFTA and the EC on the 
basis of the Luxembourg Declaration could hardly record any progress was that the EC 
focused so much on its own development. First of all, it intended to push the Internal 
Market program as fast as possible towards its realization before starting any other projects; 
the Internal Market program was an outspoken priority of the EC. Additionally, the EC 
wanted to reserve exclusive membership in the Internal Market for its members. The 
community did not want to put the project at risk by including EFTA-members. However, the 
EC was not entirely to blame, as some EFTA-partners were not enthusiastic about the four 
freedoms.332 That combination put negotiations between EFTA and the EC on a rather slow 
track. Austria realized that with the EFTA alone the country’s full involvement in the Single 
Market could not be guaranteed in the near future. In the light of this new knowledge, the 
terms and conditions changed, and from the response by the EC, the only way for Austria to 
gain full and equal participation in the European Internal Market was exclusively through 
membership in the EC.333 
In addition to the advantages, one big disadvantage in just participating in the Single Market 
together with the EC as an EFTA-member became obvious. Advantages were not only seen in 
the construction of a large economic area with 320 million consumers and in the creation of 
equality of competition, but it also became clear that the Single Market should have positive 
consequences on the labour market situation, as well as on purchasing power. Additionally, 
the Single Market would also open up other and new possibilities for Austria, such as the 
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participation in research and education programs.334 Among these benefits one big 
disadvantage stuck out. If Austria would only cooperate with the EC as an EFTA-member, it 
would not be able to fully participate in the decision-making process, meaning it would have 
a voice, but not a vote.335 
The Annual Report of 1988 stated that some looked for alternatives to full membership in 
the EC. They thought Austrian interests could be best served by a high number of bilateral 
agreements EC and Austria. From their point of view this field of possible cooperation had 
not been exhausted, compared to other EFTA partners. It was perceived as a potential 
alternative, but was rejected because bilateral agreements could only go so far. In addition 
to these doubts, it was also not likely to happen that an outsider would be allowed to always 
pick where and when to participate whenever it suited the other party.336 
The changes that the USSR was experiencing under Mikhail Gorbachev (perestroika and 
glasnost) are often mistakenly interpreted as the reason for the change of Austria’s intention 
to participate in the EC’s Single Market.337 Indeed, in May 1988, the changes that were about 
to take place in the coming months and in 1989, were unforeseen at the time that Vranitzky 
and Mock decided to work towards full membership. 
On 5 July 1988, the report of the Working Group for European Integration was accepted by 
the government. Earlier the working group had unanimously decided on the final draft of the 
report on 20 June. Unanimity in this particular case was clearly a sign of political consensus 
among the members of this working group.338 What the report did not contain was an 
explicit recommendation on whether a membership to the EC should be pursued, or not. 
The working group was not in a position to do so, since it lacked a mandate for such an 
act.339 Still, the report had significant impact on Austria’s future and in particular on its way 
to membership. The report had two parts: the first one was an introduction with political 
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overtone (covered on 19 pages), and the other one (about 700 pages) can be summed up as 
the technical-legal part. Three main conclusions were drawn in the report. The first was that 
an “emphasis was put on the ‘vital interest’, which a comprehensive participation in the 
socio-economic process of the EC for Austria” had. Next it was mentioned that full and 
comprehensive participation in the Internal Market would not cause any insurmountable 
obstacles. Second, the ‘pragmatic method’ (which was described as the global approach 
earlier) turned out to be not as effective as it intended to be. It would leave the country far 
behind the legal target and, in addition, a lack of codetermination would be anything but 
satisfactory. In favor of a partnership with the EC, the third remark pointed out that 
codetermination was tied to a full membership and, consequently, was the only way that 
allowed equal participation.340 
That codetermination, the full participation in the decision making process, was one of the 
main conclusions of the working group’s report turned out to be essential in the future. 
Codetermination was also used as an argument in favor of an active participation in the EC in 
terms of sovereignty. The problem mentioned in this context was seen in ‘real vs. formal 
sovereignty’ in the community of states, which was marked with a never before seen 
interdependence.341 In case of Austria’s participation, the right of codetermination was 
assured, which meant the strengthening of sovereignty rather than the loss of it. Having to 
take over regulations that are made by a body in a process where the country has no 
opportunity to influence the process or the outcome by any powerful means, was seen as a 
greater danger to one’s sovereignty than vice versa. 
In the fall of 1988 (October), a road map for the further course of actions on the EC issue 
was worked out during a government meeting. According to this road map, Parliament was 
supposed to deal with the report of the working group in the first half of 1989. After doing 
so, Parliament was asked to decide whether Austria should pursue a participation in the EC, 
or not.342 
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The reactions Austria received, after declaring its attempt to change the relations with the 
EC in favor of full membership, cannot be described as very positive ones. In fact, Austria’s 
EFTA-partners felt some sort of betrayal that Austria, after the Luxembourg declaration in 
1984, preferred an EC membership over them. It was in November 1988, when the 
responsible minister for the matter, Michael Graff (Minister for Economic Affairs), informed 
his EFTA colleagues about the Austrian position on a possible application for membership.343 
The response from the EC on that matter was also not very positive. As mentioned 
previously, the EC was busy dealing with its own issues such as the SEA, preparatory work for 
the Maastricht Treaty, and the inclusion of three new members (Greece, Spain and Portugal) 
in the daily working process.  
In April 1988, an EC office opened its doors in Vienna, which brought EC-Commissioner Willy 
de Clerq to Austria. He openly declared that he rather wanted Austria to pursue relations 
with the EC in the framework of the global approach, hand in hand with its EFTA-partners.344 
This global approach though (also referred to as pragmatic method) was evaluated as too 
inefficient in the Working Group for European Integration’s report, which was presented 
only a couple of months later. In January 1989, Jacques Delors, President of the European 
Commission, presented his idea of a European Economic Area (EEA) to the EC Parliament. 
This presentation included the role of the EFTA in the future, in which the association would 
function as the second column of the integration process of the EC, and in which it should 
speak with one voice. It was intended to work as an interim solution, until a full  membership 
was possible for those countries interested in such. But for Mock this concept was not a 
serious alternative to accession. It would guarantee the four freedoms in the whole EEA, but 
it would cut out several important policy fields (such as agricultural policy), and it would 
treat EFTA-partners as a third party in the decision-making process.345 Many people 
interpreted this statement by Delors as a rejection of Austria’s wish to become a full 
member of the EC.346 Furthermore was it only presented a couple of months before the 
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Austrian Parliament actually decided to send an application to the EC and to opt for full 
membership.  
Unlike Austria’s rather negative reaction to Delors’ idea, the reactions of other EFTA-
partners were positive.347 Nevertheless not even the official statement of the Commission, in 
which they claimed that no further enlargement would be possible until 1992 (after the 
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty) and would not be supported by them, could keep 
Austria from pursuing what it thought was the necessary and right thing to do. Namely, to 
convince the EC of the importance, of Austria becoming a member in the community.   
Moscow also needs to be included in the group of doubters.348 However as it turned out, in 
the following years Moscow’s line was not as harsh and nonnegotiable as it was first 
anticipated to be. The ambassador of the Soviet Union to Austria, Gennady Shikin, was the 
first one to openly announce that an EC accession would not be compatible with Austria’s 
neutrality. That same kind of criticism could be heard from Gennadi Gerasimov, a 
spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.349 Mock countered with a statement that 
neutrality was without any question kept in mind,350 and that the Western European Union 
(WEU) was a military alliance located outside of the EC’s legal framework as a separate 
union.351 Shikin and Gerasimov were known as hardliners on that matter. Despite this, when 
Mock and Vranitzky were in Moscow for official visits in the fall of 1988, talks were held in a 
very different atmosphere than was anticipated.  
Alois Mock was in Moscow 11-14 September 1988. After talks with leading politicians in the 
Kremlin, he summed up that there is no ‘Njet!’ from their side on Austria’s intention to join 
the EC.352 Everybody in the Foreign Ministry was well aware of the importance of Mock’s 
visit to Moscow. For this reason a list of argumentations was worked out in order to be 
prepared for any possible situation. This list also included a rather interesting argument. 
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Namely, that if no satisfying solution for Austria’s neutrality could be found during the 
accession negotiations, another form of cooperation, next to full participation in the EC, has 
to be figured out.353 The purpose of this statement was to show the respect Austria paid its 
neutrality obligation, and that accession would not be carried out under all circumstances. 
During his visit, Mock met with his Soviet colleague Eduard Shevardnadze, who made it clear 
that he very much understood Austria’s desire to regulate the relationship with the EC on 
new terms and if the EC were simply just an economic organization, he would not see any 
problem in Austria becoming a member. However, since the reality was different, and the EC 
was to some degree a political organization with a military aspect, he could not see how an 
accession could be compatible with neutrality.354 This was the biggest problem 
Shevardnadze saw in Austria’s intentions. That said, he also mentioned that if a qualitative 
change in Europe (breakthroughs in disarmament with the USA and Europe, and a 
continuance of the CSCE355) took place, a different evaluation of an Austrian accession could 
be possible.356 What Shevardnadze was not able to know at this point in time was that the 
circumstances in Europe, and the rest of the world, were about to change and create an 
entirely different situation.  
As mentioned earlier, Franz Vranitzky was also in Moscow only one month after the Vice 
Chancellor (October 10-13).357 After meetings between Vranitzky and Gorbachev, and with 
Nikolai Ryzhkov (who was chairman of the council of ministers), the other’s point of few was 
better understood. Ryzhkov even pointed out that he would acknowledge Austria’s 
participation in the Single Market as an economical necessity. Still, he still could not see how 
neutrality and an EC membership could be combined.358 
Already in November 1988, expertise by the Foreign Ministry stated that an EC membership 
would be possible under maintenance of neutrality. Nevertheless precautionary measures 
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and clarifications had to be made to ensure Austrian neutrality during the accession 
negotiations.359 In addition, civil servants of the Foreign Ministry started to work on the 
wording of Austria’s neutrality passage for a possible future membership application. From 
the beginning this group agreed on two basic elements of its work. First, the application had 
to include a remark on the permanent neutrality. Furthermore, protection of it was regarded 
as essential. Second, it was necessary to state that Austria’s international acknowledge 
status of permanent neutrality was intended to be kept, and that during the negotiations 
and in the result of those, would be respected.360 This rather vague wording on Austria’s 
neutrality was done on purpose, and not because the civil servants could not agree on a 
precise wording. It was driven by the opinion that a rushed definition might develop a 
different connotation than the originally intended meaning and could harm future 
developments. It could even go that far that a new angle on the definition was not possible 
in the future.361 
All in all, the answers that Austria got from its international partners were still not very 
positive. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry, with Alois Mock as its leading figure, kept 
pushing the issue of an active participation in the EC, and repeatedly pointed out the 
positive effects such a partnership would have for all parties. 
According to the road map mentioned earlier, a decision whether an accession to the EC 
should or should not be pursed needed to be made by Parliament in the first half of 1989. It 
was possible to stick to this plan and have a decision ready before Parliament began its 
summer break. In February 1989, the report of the Working Group for European Integration 
was presented by the Foreign Minister to the National Council. To prepare that report for its 
presentation, a subcommittee was founded, and began its work in March.362  
On 17 April 1989, the council of ministers came to the conclusion to opt for an accession and 
to take the necessary action in order to speed up the process.363 This decision was made 
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after the SPÖ also support an accession to the EC. In order to take at least some wind out of 
the opponent’s sails in regard to its decision, the council of ministers mentioned that several 
disadvantages were expected to turn up, and that procedures of adjustment were 
anticipated. Despite that, the positive effects would dominate overall, and the economic 
advantages would especially stand out in the long run.364 On the following day,365 the report 
of the “future arrangement of Austria’s relations to the European Communities” was 
presented to the national and federal assembly. All of that happened just one day after Alois 
Mock resigned as Vice Chancellor on 16 April 1989.366 These days must have been marked 
with mixed feelings from having to deal with personal loss (being questioned as party leader 
for quite some time at this point and, finally, leaving the position for somebody else) to 
victory (the positive decision in the council of ministers for EC accession).   
Until a final decision in Parliament was made, something unique happened between the 
Austrian parties. In the first days of April 1989, the SPÖ officially agreed, during a party 
conference, that Austria should pursue membership in the EC and not just participate in the 
Single Market with its EFTA-partners. On the following day, 5 April, the two parties in 
coalition (SPÖ and ÖVP) settled for a political party agreement. This agreement, suggested 
by Foreign Minister Mock, was finalized by the signature of the party leaders Vranitzky and 
Riegler on 19 June. Unlike what history had shown up until this point in time, the two parties 
stuck to the agreement.367 In it the SPÖ and ÖVP expressed the priority of the integration 
policy, and that this policy should last longer than just this legislative period. This 
understanding was seen as valid from that point on until the end of the negotiation process 
with the EC. Additionally, an emphasis was put on the permanent neutrality once again. The 
parties agreed that a referendum needed to be held on that matter, as was laid out by the 
Federal Constitution.368 With this political party agreement topics that would be a matter 
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during the negotiations were also anticipated. Of course, the special status of neutrality was 
one of these topics, as well as transit traffic, the maintenance of Austria’s agricultural 
structure and the rather high environmental restrictions Austria had, compared to other EC 
members.369 
The day had finally arrived, when on 29 June 1989 Parliament was asked to make a final 
decision on Austria’s application for EC membership. The very positive votes in the national 
(175 against 7 votes) and federal assembly (unanimity)370 on the report of the foreign policy 
committee and the additional motion for a resolution led to the next step. The government 
was asked to start membership negotiations with the EC and necessary application should 
be issued by fall 1989.371  
This stunning support by the Members of Parliament was the continuation of the demand of 
accession. The decision was supported by the federal states as well as by the social partners. 
Parliament, though, listed a number of facts that had to be kept in mind during the 
negotiations. This list included Austria’s permanent neutrality as well as respect for the 
democratic participation of the people; the principle of the federal state; protection of the 
high standards in the social area, as well as in the field of environmental policy; and the 
maintenance of Austria’s agricultural structure. On the matter of transit traffic, Parliament 
noted that the issue had to be negotiated separately to accession negotiations and had to be 
solved before the negotiations were even set to begin.372  
Particular aspects, which already influenced the political party agreement, were again picked 
up by Parliament that day. This, once again, proved how well aware the people in charge 
were of the crucial points that would turn up during the EC membership negotiations. 
Additionally, it demonstrated how in depth several issues had been tackled in order to be 
able to point out crucial topics; after the government was asked by Parliament to apply for 
membership in the EC, Austria had done its best to be well prepared for the tough 
negotiations that were to take place. 
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As mentioned earlier, the government was asked to send its application to the EC in the fall 
of 1989. A discussion on the wording of the application started right after Parliament’s 
decision, and it lasted until the final minutes of discussions between Chancellor Vranitzky, 
Vice Chancellor Riegler and Foreign Minister Mock. Mock was able to get his views heard 
and due to his intervention, legal obligations based on Austria’s neutrality, and explicit 
references on neutrality policies were included in the wording.373  
It was not even a month after the Parliament’s decision that the applications for 
membership to the three communities were finished. Mock handed them to his French 
colleague Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, the President of the Council of the European 
Communities at this point, on 17 July 1989: 
Mr. President,  
On behalf of the Republic of Austria I herby have the honour to present 
Austria’s application for membership in the European Economic 
Community. 
Austria presents this application on the understanding that her 
internationally recognized status of permanent neutrality, based on the 
Federal Constitutional Law of  October 26, 1955, shall be maintained and 
that also as a member of the European Communities by virtue of the treaty 
of accession she will be in a position to fulfill her legal obligation resulting 
from her status of permanent neutrality and to continue her policy of 
neutrality, as a specific contribution towards the maintenance of peace and 
security in Europe.  
Accept, Mr. President, that assurances of my highest consideration.  
Alois Mock 
His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, President of the Council of the European 
Communities Brussels.374  
Even though the application was actually handed over on 17 July, the letter was still dated 
with 14 July 1989.375 Mock insisted on dating the letter on this particular day in order to 
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show his respect to French history. By doing so he further intended to point out the 
importance of the French Revolution for the European development in every aspect.376  
The timing of Austria’s application could not have been any better. In July 1989, Austria was 
not a petitioner; it was a country that, due to its economical ability, would be a net 
contributor. Austria saw itself as a bridge builder between the East and West, and as a 
country with a working crisis management and an effective security policy. If Austria had 
applied any later, maybe along with countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Slovenia, the country might have run in the risk of being generalized with these 
states.377 This would have put Austria into a whole different position, in which it would not 
have been able to insist on certain issues and drive a determined bargain policy. 
With its application Austria signaled that it considered itself as being bound to Europe by 
history and culture. Just as the other EC members, it agreed to the goals set by the founding 
treaties and by the SEA, and was ready to take over the rights, as well as the obligations, 
which were given to the member states by these treaties. Therefore, the application for 
membership can be understood as a consequence of continuation of Austria’s integration 
policy and additionally the only possibility to become actively involved in the 
communities.378 
Even though Austria had always been told that accession would not be possible before 1992, 
before the Maastricht Treaty was being agreed on, it still demanded a quick start to 
negotiations. In its report, the Foreign Ministry also claimed that projects within the EC 
should not get in the way of these negotiations.379 
Responses to Austria’s application from the EC’s side were generally positive, except for the 
response of the Belgium Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens. Mock met up with Eyskens shortly 
after the applications were handed over to Dumas. The Belgium Minister doubted that 
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Austria’s neutrality would not cause any problems if it kept insisting on it.380 For this 
statement Eyskens was even criticized by his own government, especially by Willy Claes, who 
stated that Eyskens’ reaction was too early and not coordinated. In other words, this 
reaction showed Austria how sensible it had been to deal with the issue of neutrality.381  
The first reactions from Moscow included a categorical ‘no’ to Austria’s attempts. Moscow 
saw Austria’s neutrality as incompatible with an EC membership since the communities also 
had a component of military and security policy to them, but only two months after that, in 
October 1989, Michael Gorbachev revised this official statement. He announced that every 
country had the right to decide on its own relations, which included the right to choose to 
participate in an organization.382 
 
4.5 The Path to the Beginning of Actual Negotiations  
Shortly after Alois Mock submitted Austria’s application for EC membership to Roland 
Dumas, the formal procedure within the EC started. The European Council asked the EC 
Commission to start its screening on 28 July 1989.383 As is the procedure, the EC Commission 
and Austrian delegates (drawn together by the Working Group for European Integration) 
worked together on the screening report. This meant extensive work until the report could 
be finalized by the Commission384 and until the Council would be able to make a final 
decision. Due to the great workload, this report would not be issued until the end of July 
1991 and, therefore, is discussed later on.  
Until the actual negotiations could begin, the Foreign Ministry strategically used this time for 
detailed preparations.385 Consequently, the Working Group for European Integration 
became increasingly important. It was its job to prepare the Foreign Ministry for the 
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upcoming negotiations. And in 1989, a second working group, located in the Federal 
Chancellery, was created to respond to questions on the intended integration. Its main 
responsibilities were coordination in Austria and the preparation of basic positions for the 
negotiations.386 
The Foreign Ministry also used the time after the application to issue a memorandum in July 
1989. It was passed on to all EC member states as well as to the EC Council, Parliament and 
Commission. The idea behind the memorandum was to add credibility to Austria’s 
application, and was consciously used to impact the decision making process in these 
bodies.387 Furthermore, this memorandum gave room to elaborate some ideas and, 
additionally, was an opportunity for corrections, which had become necessary since the 
application. For that reason the memorandum was also referred to as the ‘second 
application’ and successfully helped to dismantle reservations within the EC. With it the 
basis for a far more open and constructive discussion was built, hence, the memorandum 
fulfilled all its intention.388  
What was so new in this memorandum to the people, who were sooner or later asked to 
form an opinion and to make a decision whether to start negotiations, or not? In the 
memorandum from 1990 Austria highlighted its connection with the EC and described it as 
being bound to Europe by history. It argued that Austria had, since it gained independence in 
1955, been part of the Western cooperation and integration and considered itself part of the 
European family. To put it differently, the Foreign Ministry intended to point out that Austria 
was aware of its rights and obligations and wanted to be part of the EC, which was going to 
influence the continent as well as Austria in the future. Naturally, the positive effects of a full 
membership were also pointed out. One of them was that Austria’s experience and long 
engagement in the East would be of great advantage in a changing world, in which 
cooperation had become more important than ever before. Furthermore Austria was 
committed to the EC’s goals set in the founding treaties and saw the permanent neutrality as 
a contribution to ensure freedom and security. Austria also portrayed itself as a stable 
                                                          
386 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 70 
387
 Mock 1994, p. 97 
388 Scheich 2005, p. 71 
89 
 
partner with a socio-economic area that would be able to integrate into the community 
without any problem. Additionally, Austria would be a net contributor due to its high GDP. In 
the memorandum, the Foreign Ministry also expressed its wish that the screening report by 
the Commission would be drawn up as fast as possible. It concluded with the hope that 
Austria’s membership was not put on hold because of new priorities in the EC.389 
The memorandum was not the only attempt to improve Austria’s relations with EC 
members. In order to convince them about the advantages of accelerating Austria’s 
membership to the EC, additional measures were taken. Before the EC summit in Dublin on 
28 April 1990, Austria hosted a number of events in all capitals across the EC. During these 
events Austria once again anticipated the value of informing the countries about Austria’s 
intentions.  
Additionally, during a lot of official visits by Austrian representatives to the EC member 
countries, the application was constantly discussed. Rather soon it became obvious that the 
question ‘if’ Austria should join the EC was no longer asked. The question was refocused on 
‘when’ that would happen.390 As previously mentioned the question ‘when’ was answered 
with not before 1993, but until then the time would be used practically, namely by preparing 
the country and the people involved as much as possible in order to shorten the actual time 
required for the negotiations.  
From this aspect, the participation in the EEA with Austria’s EFTA-partners was an important-
gap filling opportunity. It was used to distinguish Austria and was an opportunity to be 
integrated in the Single Market. This would be one aspect less to worry about, when the 
actual negotiations began. In addition, it allowed participation as early as in 1993 in this 
specific area, as membership for Austria was very unlikely to happen before that time.391 
On 7 October 1990, the Austrian people elected a new national assembly. During the 
election campaigns, Austria’s potential membership to the EC did not play a major role. This 
can be explained by the fact that the negotiations had not started. As a result, it was a rather 
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uninteresting issue, and the campaigns were dominated by domestic matters. The election 
result allowed more possibilities than a renewal of the grand coalition. A grand coalition was 
the only option for the future though, as Vranitzky put it in the first speech he gave as the 
new Chancellor in front of the national assembly in 1990. The challenges that the 
government had to face in the upcoming years required a stable foundation. A coalition 
between SPÖ and ÖVP was, according to Vranitzky, the only opportunity to guarantee such a 
foundation.392 Even though the EC was not discussed before the election, the issue found its 
way into the new coalition agreement.393  
The new government was presented to Parliament on 18 December 1990, and laid out its 
coalition agreement to the national assembly. The EC was mentioned as a main focus of the 
new government and the intention to speed up the pace of the integration process was 
reconfirmed in the agreement. A full membership was still the number one priority, so 
Austria would be able to participate in the EC’s development as an equal partner. Vranitzky 
stated that Austria’s neutrality could stabilize the European system. Additionally, he 
considered a political union as a positive input for a future European security system, in 
which Austria could be a part of - even with its neutrality.394 In a separate section, the 
Chancellor mentioned the transit traffic problem and highlighted the necessity of an 
agreement with the EC before the negotiations would start. This was interpreted as a 
prerequisite so as to avoid negative bargaining for Austria.395 The mention the matter of 
transit traffic indicated that this was going to be an issue heavily discussed between Austria 
and the EC. As it turned out in the course of the negotiations, it was indeed one of the major 
concerns. 
On 31 July 1991, the long anticipated screening report by the EC Commission was presented. 
It included the Commission’s recommendation to start negotiations without prerequisites. 
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The report evaluated Austria as being ready for Europe, but also pointed out three crucial 
matters. It drew “attention to problems in the areas of neutrality, transit traffic and 
agriculture, but also expresses its confidence that these can be resolved in the course of 
negotiations.”396 Other than that, the EC Commission referred to Austria as willing and very 
interested in the integration process, and the only EFTA-member that had persistently 
sought EC membership.397 The report noted that the accession of Austria was going to be 
profitable for the EC as a whole, since Austria would be able to contribute to a fast 
implementation of a monetary union. Additionally, it could provide knowledge, which it had 
gained throughout history as a country that is located in the middle of Europe. In terms of 
neutrality, the EC saw no insurmountable obstacles related to that matter, but predicted 
harsh confrontations on the issue of transit traffic. A bilateral agreement between the EC 
and Austria was established on this particular topic, which the Austrian government 
intended to honor even after its successful accession. Interim solutions would be negotiated 
in the agricultural sector and, therefore, should not be a serious threat to successful 
accession negotiations.398 Alois Mock interpreted the report issued by the EC Commission as 
a compliment to the work Austria had done so far. It showed that the applicant country 
would not just be another member, but instead would be a member of the core group.399 
Austria insisted on an accession date rather soon, and kept repeating its wish that 
modifications within the EC should not be a reason to keep Austria out of the club. 
Nevertheless, the EC Commission set 1 January 1993 as the day to start the actual accession 
negotiations, after the work on the Internal Market was finished.400  
In the meantime, an agreement on the EEA between the EFTA and the EC was finally reached 
in October 1991. Additionally, the negotiations on transit traffic were concluded before the 
actual accession negotiations started. These issues, which usually are items of such 
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negotiations and big chunks of it, were already agreed on, and it became more and more 
likely that by January 1995 Austria could be a full member of the EC.401 
On 7 February 1992, the member states of the EC signed the Treaty on European Union. The 
EC agreed on it in December 1991, however, would not take effect until November 1993. 
This treaty created the European Union with its well known pillar structure. The first pillar 
consisted of the EC, the second pillar being the CFSP and the third one, Justice and Home 
Affairs (this pillar was later renamed as Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters). 
The second and third pillars were organized as intergovernmental, whereas the first pillar 
was supranational. Within this first pillar the European Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council had the most power. The Treaty on European Union was also the foundation for the 
creation of Europe’s single currency. Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity was 
established by the new treaty. This principle should guarantee that the Union only gets 
involved when the matter in question can best be solved on the Union’s level. Subsidiarity 
should avoid the creation of a too centralized system and prevent the EU from dealing with 
issues that could easily be handled by a local or national authority.  
The Treaty on European Union was a big step in the integration process for the community, 
as it laid out new ways of interaction and completely new possibilities. Compared to the 
constellation of what Austria applied to in 1989, the community was something different in 
1993, when the treaty was finally in force. Doubters argued that the second pillar (CFSP) was 
incompatible with Austria’s neutrality, but this group was not given too much attention. Still, 
it was reason enough for the Foreign Ministry to issue a second memorandum. 
This memorandum was sent to each EC member state and to Brussels in June 1992. It dealt 
with the CFSP on the basis of the new treaty. By looking at the memorandum, a further 
development of Austria’s position on neutrality can be seen, however this was not the only 
reason why this second memorandum was issued; it was also intended to accelerate the 
process of the EC proceeding to start negotiations on accession.402 Once again, the 
memorandum pointed out the positive effects and benefits an Austrian membership would 
have. It mentioned Austria’s commitment to the ideas and goals set by the European 
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integration over the past decades and that Austria would be (just as the other EFTA-partners 
that applied or were going to apply for membership) a net contributor to the EC. 
Furthermore, the memorandum pointed out Austria’s role in Europe due to its geographical 
position. A new aspect in this memorandum was that neutrality per se was not mentioned. 
The CFSP was seen as a development that Austria could fully identify with and to which it 
assured its active participation. Austria’s national security could only be guaranteed through 
this cooperation and was inseparable from it. In other words, the CFSP should act as a 
framework for the security of Austria. Austria was well aware of this fact. The memorandum 
also indicated that Austria was eager to participate in a new European security structure 
within the European Union.403 
Another aspect, which should be mentioned at this point, was the (rising) conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia. The war, in very close proximity to Austria’s border, demonstrated that 
armed conflict was still possible in Europe. Suddenly, Europe’s helplessness became quite 
apparent; it could not provide the tools to effectively deal with a war in the middle of the 
continent. With this conflict in mind, the Treaty on European Union and the concept of the 
CFSP, including the perspective on a security policy, were of increasing importance and 
offered a response to the changing situation in Europe.404 With this knowledge it is 
understandable why Austria was eager to fully accept and participate in the CFSP.  
The development of Austria’s interpretation of its neutrality needs to be viewed in light of a 
changing world. World politics looked very different in 1992 when the second memorandum 
was issued than it did in 1989, when the actual application for membership was handed over 
to Dumas. In 1992, Europe was able to set the focus on itself, and no longer had to pay 
attention to the opinions of the East and West. Moreover, the security situation had 
completely changed over the past years.405 Austria used this new found freedom by 
interpreting its neutrality in a different way and later on, during the accession negotiations, 
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was able to find a solution on the neutrality question by using paragraphs from the second 
memorandum.406 
On 26/27 June 1992, the European Council’s summit was held in Lisbon. At this summit, the 
Council made a resolution “that negotiations on enlarging the European Community should 
be opened with Austria, Finland and Sweden at the beginning of 1993.”407 However, the 
negotiations were only to begin when the Treaty on European Union was ratified by the 
applicants and when an agreement on the fiscal program was found.408 
When it became obvious that the European Council would make a final decision on the 
applications of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Austria sent out another short memorandum 
just before the summit in Edinburgh was held. Even though the Treaty on European Union 
was not going to be in force for another 10 months, the accession negotiations would be 
based on it. In the memorandum, Austria expressed that it had no reservations regarding 
negotiating on this new basis. In accordance with that Austria stated that its application 
from 1989 was also directed to the newly founded European Union. Additionally, it admitted 
to the new treaty, which the member states agreed on in Maastricht.409  
In Edinburgh on 11/12 December 1992, the European Council finally decided that 
negotiations with all the new applicants would start at the beginning of 1993. Even the fact 
that the Treaty on European Union was not going to be effective for another 10 months did 
not hold the beginning of the negotiations back.410  
As a reaction to the ‘yes’ by the Council, Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign Minister Mock 
gave a speech in front of Parliament only two days later, on 14 December. They both 
informed the Members of Parliament about the recent developments, and what 
consequences this decision would have for Austria. The Chancellor, as well as the Foreign 
Minister, did not forget to mention the historical importance of the Council’s decision in 
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Edinburgh, for both the EC and for Austria. Both repeated the commitments to the old 
treaties and to the Treaty on European Union (in this aspect especially the CFSP). At the end 
of his speech, Mock appealed to the consciences of the parties in opposition and concluded 
that membership to the EC needed to be of vital interest for all parties in Parliament. He 
called on the Members of Parliament to act in concert and added that membership was the 
only factor that could guarantee a secure Europe and, as previously noted, was essential for 
Austria’s security.411  
Negotiations between Austria and the EC were set to start on 1 February 1993. The Austrian 
government agreed on the negotiating positions on 26 January 1993. A report by Vranitzky 
and Mock provided the basis of this decision.412 In the first part of the report, Austria’s 
motivations for wanting to become a member (a stable economy, benefits in foreign and 
security policy, and the only possibility to be a part in the decision-making process in 
Europe), were repeated. In its second chapter, the proceedings of the negotiations were 
explained, and stated that negotiations would take place on three different levels. Meetings 
of the Foreign Ministers of the applying countries and the Foreign Ministers of the EC 
member states were the first and highest level. On the second level deputies (ambassadors) 
met, and the third level was put together by experts. On ministerial level Foreign Minister 
Alois Mock was responsible for the negotiations, which was indicated in the third chapter of 
the report. On the second level ambassador Manfred Scheich was nominated as the head of 
the delegation. The fourth part of the report consisted of the negotiating positions. Parts of 
the second memorandum from June 1992 were replaced by this report (such as Austria 
admitting to the Treaty on European Union, the participation on European integration and 
the adoption of the acquis, and Austria’s dedication to the CFSP), but also new fields were 
added. Environmental policy was mentioned in this list, as well as Austria’s wish to keep its 
rather strict regulations in that particular area. Additionally, it mentioned that a membership 
in the EC could not affect Austria’s ban on the use of atomic energy. In terms of transport 
policy, the bilateral agreement between the EC and Austria on transit traffic of heavy goods 
vehicles needed to be kept in force as long as it was decided in an earlier agreement (further 
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elaborated above). Furthermore, Austria wanted its own way in social and income 
distribution policy. This was seen as a necessity in order to be able to guarantee the current 
standard and its further development. Numerous other negotiation positions were 
mentioned. Among them were also those matters that were pointed out by the EC 
Commission from the very beginning, for example the agricultural issue. Concerning this 
aspect, Austria claimed financial support by the EC in order to not stress the national budget 
too much. The report also mentioned that a membership could not affect basic rights of the 
Austrian constitution.413 
 
4.6 Actual negotiations with the EU 
With the decision of the council of ministers on this report and the authority to negotiate in 
the name of the Republic of Austria, Foreign Minister Alois Mock, along with other 
delegates,414 took part in the formal start of the negotiations on 1 February 1993 in 
Brussels.415 Both sides, the EC and Austria, officially presented each other’s positions. None 
of these were a surprise to anybody involved, and it was more of a repetition of facts that 
had been known beforehand. Neither side missed the opportunity though to highlight the 
historic significance that lay within the start of such negotiations.416 
During 1993, five rounds of negotiations took place on the ministerial level. In the first half 
of 1993, the Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen was chief negotiator on the EC’s 
side (Denmark held the EU presidency at this time). Denmark was succeeded by Belgium, 
with chief negotiator being Willy Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister at the time. On the level 
of delegates/ambassadors, eight negotiation rounds took place. A total of 29 different 
chapters417 needed to be discussed, and at the end of 1993, already thirteen of them were 
concluded. Ten other chapters were negotiated up to a point, where the actual closing was 
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only a matter of time. With this success in a rather short period of time Austria was, 
therefore, able to focus on the chapters that seemed to be of significant importance for the 
country in 1994: transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles, agriculture, and regulations on 
second homes.418 
The desire to conclude the negotiations by the beginning of March 1994 grew steadily. The 
reason for this urgency was that if negotiations could be finished by then, the accession of 
the applying states would be possible on 1 January 1995.419 
On 1 November 1993, the Treaty on European Union, which had already been the basis of 
the negotiations so far, came into force. The necessity to agree on a definition of Austria’s 
neutrality became more relevant at that point. Finally, the council of ministers was able to 
agree on a common definition on 9 November, which stated that the Republic of Austria had 
sole power – also in the future – in regard to the interpretation of that matter. The 
interpretation, which was accepted by the council of ministers on that very day in 
November, recorded that Austria was not obliged to participate in wars with military means, 
nor did it have to join a military alliance, and further was it not obligated to host foreign 
military bases on its territory. In order to be able to fulfill this position, legal actions within 
Austria had to be taken. Nevertheless, Austria stated that it would contribute to the 
development of security policy structures as they were foreseen in the Treaty on European 
Union. With this interpretation, the understanding of neutrality can be interpreted as being 
minimized to its core area.420 
Alois Mock presented the neutrality interpretation to the EC on the very same day during 
negotiations on ministerial level. This meeting was held in order to open up negotiations on 
the chapter of CFSP. The reason why neutrality was interpreted in exactly this way was done 
to prevent the other side (EC) from discussing that matter. Mock added in his statement that 
Austria saw an important step in the CFSP towards a stronger international capacity to take 
actions, and that it fully agreed with the decisions made in the treaty on the CFSP. 421 With 
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these ground rules laid out by the Foreign Minister, the legal negotiations on the level of 
ambassadors began. On 20 December, the EC’s Foreign Ministers were able to agree on a 
common position on the CFSP chapter, which was submitted to the potential new 
candidates. It also included the unreserved acceptance of the acquis communautaire. Only 
one day later, the Austrian council of ministers accepted this paper and the chapter of 
neutrality was successfully agreed upon and could be closed.422 
This, however, was not the only success that was achieved by the end of 1993. Additionally, 
the question of environmental standards could be solved. Austria was granted the right to 
keep its standards for the next four years. During this time the EU obligated itself to revise 
its own standards instead.423 
As mentioned earlier, Austria and the European Union wanted to finish the negotiations by 
March 1994. Certainly, an intense closing phase was imminent. Even though most issues 
where solved by then, as Mock described it himself, some were better tackled and solved 
under the pressure of time and a solution had to be found.424 These remaining issues were 
the questions over regulations on second homes, agriculture and transit traffic of heavy 
good vehicles. In a speech given in front of the national assembly on 19 January Foreign 
Minister Mock outlined that even within these sensitive matters, compromises began to 
evolve. He shared the optimism that the negotiations could be brought to an end by March, 
as was intended.425 
The final negotiations on the level of Ministers took place from 25 February until 1 March 
1994. These days were exhausting and very intense and for the Austrian Delegation. Not 
only did the European Union meet with the Austrian delegation, but it negotiated with all 
potential members at the time, which included Sweden, Finland and Norway. Out of them, 
Austria had the biggest delegation with almost 90 delegates. Next to Foreign Minister Mock, 
Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina, Minister of Economic Affairs Wolfgang Schüssel, Minster 
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for Agriculture and Forestry Franz Fischler, Minister of Transport Viktor Klima and State 
Secretary Brigitte Ederer were part of this delegation, in addition to numerous prominent 
delegates from the social partners.426  
This delegation was more or less nonstop on duty during the negations, which in the 
literature is also referred to as ‘Jumbo Meeting of Ministers’.427 Even though the delegation 
consisted of people from very different political backgrounds, Mock described the spirit of 
Brussels as something unique, something he had never experienced before. As soon as 
Austria’s future was at stake, all delegates pulled together and tried to get the best out of it 
for the Republic; the interests of parties were no longer relevant at this point.428 
Out of the remaining issues, the matter of second homes was the first one that was 
solved.429 On only the second day of negotiations the delegates were able to reach a very 
satisfying compromise for Austria. It allowed it to keep its current regulations in terms of 
control and restrictions on second homes over a period of five years. Even after this period, 
Austria was granted extensions of its regulations to some degree, and was, by doing so, able 
to first serve the need of its own population as the Annual Report of the Foreign Ministry 
stated.430 Austria’s dedication on that matter was driven by the fear that a sale of Austrian 
property among non-Austrians would take place after the country had become an EU 
member.431 
However, as successful as the negotiations began, the progress quickly faded away. Next on 
the agenda was the issue of agriculture. It was obvious to everybody involved in the process 
that this would not be an easy one. Some voices within the EU (namely The Netherlands and 
France) did not want to make an exception for Austria. They argued that the Internal Market 
also had to come into force for Austria’s agriculture sector when full membership was 
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achieved, namely, without any transition regulations or exceptions.432 Austria feared that 
prices for agricultural goods had to be lowered if the Internal Market was effective from the 
very beginning. It was predicted that the lowering of prices would have a huge impact on 
Austrian farmer’s income – in a rather negative way.433 
Fortunately, Franz Fischler, Federal Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, was able to come 
up with a compromise that served the needs of and was acceptable to all parties involved. 
His proposal was put together by subsidies of the EU and by grants from the Austrian 
national budget. It was created to support farmers in building up an agricultural sector which 
was designed to protect the environment and to sustain tradition in that particular sector. 
Later on, this concept served as a model for agricultural subsidies within in the EU.434 
The last matter that needed to be agreed upon concerned transit traffic of heavy goods 
vehicles regulations. Austria was, and still is today, an important transit route in Central 
Europe. As mentioned earlier, Austria was able to sign a contract on that matter with the EC, 
which came into force just at the beginning of 1994. The Austrian delegation intended to 
keep the commitments laid out in this contract. But again, this issue required a lot of 
bargaining.  
When the negotiations were at stake, due to the difficulties in the areas of agriculture and 
transit traffic, Foreign Minister Alois Mock mentioned in front of the press that there was a 
limit to the price that would be paid for membership.435 Nevertheless, he was well aware of 
the consequences that a negative outcome of the negotiations could have for Austria. He 
pointed out that Austria might run in danger of becoming a second-class country in Europe 
and in order to avoid such a predicament every possible measure had to be taken into 
account.436 
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Negotiations between Austria and the EU lasted until the very last minute. Whereas Sweden 
and Finland were able to finalize their deals in the early hours of 1 March 1994, Austria kept 
on negotiating, but was finally able to settle every detail later that night. Norway adjourned 
its negotiations for a week, after no solution on the fishery could be found.437 The 
negotiations with Norway were then brought to an end on 15 March.438 
It was in the late hours of 1 March 1994 that Austria was finally able to agree on a 
compromise on the issue of transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles and could successfully 
bring the negotiations to an end. Concerning the compromise, Austria was the first member 
to be granted its own transit traffic regime in its territory. It could only be set out of force if 
by 2001 a reduction of pollution of 60% was reached. Was this not the case in 2001, it would 
stay unchanged in force until 2004. Furthermore, the EU promised to provide financial 
subsidies for the building of the Brenner Base Tunnel.439 
Alois Mock described the final minutes of the negotiations as one of the most moving 
moments in his political career. He saw an enormous chance for Austria to actively 
participate and take a role in the European peace project and contribute to Europe’s 
future.440 As the negotiations ended, some delegates were even seen with tears in their 
eyes.441 These examples indicate how dedicated Mock and his delegation were. The final 
negotiations in Brussels and the tireless effort also reflect the passion that was connected to 
this historic opportunity. Asked to interpret the outcome of the negotiations, Mock stated 
that everybody considered the product of the negotiations, as a much better outcome for 
Austria than anybody had ever anticipated.442  
Foreign Minister Mock was very eager to return back to Austria after the negotiations were 
concluded. The very next day, on 2 March 1994, he gave a speech in front of the national 
assembly. He used this opportunity to shortly sum up the whole process that began when 
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Austria applied for EC membership in 1989. To bring the Members of Parliament up to date 
he informed them about the results of the negotiations of the past couple of days. Mock 
especially emphasized the achievements of the delegation on the sensitive issues, discussed 
above. He also used the chance to point out the historic significance of the current situation 
and what a big opportunity this was for Austria. His statement was followed by long lasting 
applause, as one can read in the protocols of the national assembly session, and can be seen 
as a gesture of appreciation for the tireless effort of Mock and his delegation for Austria.443 
 
4.7 The Final Steps to Membership after the Successful Negotiations  
Which tasks still needed to be done, before Austria could call itself a member of the 
European Union? Foremost, “the European Parliament, acting ‘by an absolute majority of its 
component members’, has to give its assent to membership applications.”444 Second, the 
accession to the Union was going to change the Austrian constitution. It was, therefore, 
compulsory for Austria to hold a referendum on that matter. Before such a referendum 
could take place, it was necessary that the Austrian national assembly and the Federal 
Council took a vote on the proposed changed law. As the final step, after a positive outcome 
of the referendum, the Treaty of Accession needed to be signed. 
On 4 May 1994, the European Parliament approved the upcoming enlargement. There was a 
slight concern as to whether the European Parliament might use this opportunity to demand 
a reform of the institutions of the EU, before such a vote could take place. This concern, 
though, turned out to be a more or less hypothetical one. 378 members of the European 
Parliament out of 517 (24 votes against and 60 abstentions) were in favor of Austrian 
participation in this project.445 
The following day, 5 May 1994, the National Council decided upon the federal constitutional 
law, concerning the membership of Austria in the European Union. 140 out of 185 votes 
supported the law. After the National Council, the Federal Council voted with 51 against 11 
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for this particular law change.446 With this success, the only outstanding step in order to 
finalize EU membership by fulfilling all constitutional prerequisites was the referendum.  
The referendum in Austria was scheduled on 12 June 1994. Austria was the first out of the 
current applicants to hold the referendum, since the public opinion for a participation in the 
EU was the highest here. The other referenda were held in the same order with Norway, 
which had the lowest predicted public support, being the last. It was anticipated that high 
acceptance in one country would create a ‘spill-over’ effect that would have a positive 
impact on the outcome of the referenda in the remaining countries. As history tells us 
though, such a ‘spill-over’ effect was not successfully achieved – the referendum in Norway 
was negative. 
Before the referendum took place, Foreign Minister Mock was hospitalized due to a slipped 
disk. Still, he managed to keep on campaigning for EU membership, and a celebration held in 
Mock’s honor (to celebrate his 60th birthday in the Hofburg Palace on 10 June) turned out to 
be the final campaign-event. In an act of high praise by Erhard Busek (ÖVP chairman at this 
time), he said that the only and best present one could get Mock cannot be given to him 
today. Rather he had to wait two more days for the positive outcome of the referendum.  447  
Two days later, the day of truth had come. Soon after the first polling places closed, the 
trend became apparent; a trend that the Austrian people were in favor of EU membership, 
and that they supported the work of the government, especially the work of Foreign 
Minister Mock, was visible early on in the day.448 In the end, a total of 66.6% of an 82.3% 
turnout supported membership.449 This very high acceptance of the people can be 
interpreted as the success of an information campaign, which informed people about the 
European Union, the unity of all parties, and social partners.  
Referenda in Finland (16 October 1994) and Sweden (13 November 1994) were also positive. 
In Finland, 56.9% voted with ‘yes’, and in Sweden 52.7% were in favor of joining the EU. 
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Norway, the last country to hold the referendum on 27/28 November 1994, once again 
missed the chance to become an EU member by only 47.7% of the people supporting the 
membership idea.450 
The Treaty on Accession was then formally signed by Austria, Finland and Sweden in Corfu, 
Greece on 24 June 1994.451 The Austrian treaty was signed by Chancellor Vranitzky, Foreign 
Minister Mock, Manfred Scheich and Ulrich Stacher.452 In the run-up to this procedure, a 
dispute broke out about who was entitled to sign the treaty as the head of state. It was 
unclear whether this was President Klestil or Chancellor Vranitzky. The Treaty of Accession 
was then approved by the national assembly and the Federal Council in November,453 and 
hence could enter into force on 1 January 1995.  
 
4.8 Summary  
Finishing the formal process of accession was a milestone for Austrian politics. The previous 
treaty of the EEA between the EFTA countries and the EC was of great importance to that 
and made it possible for the accession process to conclude so quickly. Without these steps, 
the negotiations might have taken much longer. All in all, Austria was aware of the fact that 
EEA membership was the first of many steps in the right direction. However, the final step 
was not made until the Treaty of Accession was signed. It granted Austria equal rights in the 
decision-making process and in the further development of community law.454 
In order to make the transition phase easier for the new member countries, they were able 
to attend all Councils of Ministers, Permanent Representatives Committees and Council 
Working Groups meetings as observers after the signing of the Treaty of Accession. 
Additionally, participation as an observer was possible at the European Council in Corfu. 
Austria, along with the other two new members Sweden and Finland, was entitled to speak, 
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but was not involved in the decision-making. Alongside these areas of participation Austria 
was also integrated in the work of the Commission as an observer. This unique opportunity 
made it possible for the federal administration to deal with procedures and requirements 
within the EU before actual participation began.455 
Furthermore, the federal government initiated the creation of a White Paper, which would 
form the basis of information about current EU policy. It outlined Austria’s responsibilities on 
a variety of matters, and pointed out how different Austrian requests, which were made 
during the negotiations, could be incorporated. Not only did the White Paper serve to inform 
politicians, but it was also used as the basis of information for the Austrian people, and the 
basis for a broad discussion.456 
To achieve EU membership for Austria was one of the highlights of Alois Mock’s pol itical 
career. In the end, his Parkinson’s disease forced him to hand over his position as Foreign 
Minister to Wolfgang Schüssel. This illness had become much more visible over the past 
couple of months, partly due to the heavy physical effort he demanded from himself. He was 
still in office when Austria became a full member of the European Union, an event with 
which the Foreign Minister Alois Mock will always be connected. From now on, Austria was 
an equal partner in the European Union with the opportunity to participate in this unique 
framework of cooperation and to influence its further development.   
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5. Security Studies as a Mean to Explain the Empirical Events 
 
So far, this work dealt with Foreign Minister Alois Mock’s biography and his career on 
national and international level. The main focus was set on the developments in 1989 in 
Eastern Europe and on Austria’s path to EU membership in 1995. In this chapter, the 
previously elaborated historic events will be combined with theory. Theories “are a 
necessary means of bringing order to the subject matter of International Relations. Theories 
are needed to conceptualize contemporary events.”457 In order to be able to conceptualize 
the work done so far, the following section will discusses whether the two events (1989 and 
EU membership) were perceived as threats, and whether the way the Foreign Ministry 
(re)acted can be explained and better understood with the help of Security Studies. The 
Copenhagen School will be the designated theoretical approach to do so.  
 
5.1 Definitions 
Before going deeper into the subject, some definitions of terms which are widely used are 
necessary. It is for a better understanding from the very beginning of the subject, as well as 
to avoid misunderstandings.  
 
5.1.1 Security   
The meaning of security derives from the Latin word ‘securus’, which again can be 
connected to the term sine cura and means without care. It describes the feeling, which is 
subjective of a single person feeling safe.458  
Many tried to define the word security and many attempts were done during the past years 
and decades, but a general definition for security has yet to be found. It is questionable, if it 
is even possible to find one definition that has universal meaning and fits all purposes of 
security. On the one hand, a definition too wide is not helpful and on the other hand, a too 
narrow definition might lose its ability to be universally used. Collins states that among all 
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the definitions one common point can be made out, namely that security and, especially, the 
studies of security, have “to do with threats to survival.”459 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, the 
founders of the Copenhagen School, ask themselves in their book Security, A New 
Framework for Analysis, what is needed for an issue to become an international security 
issue. They can locate their answer “in the traditional military-political understanding of 
security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing 
an existential threat to a designated referent object.”460 Their understanding of security is, 
therefore, relevant since their concept of securitization is further discussed and as a concept 
of analysis applied to evaluate the designated historic events.  
 
5.1.2 Actors  
An actor in Security Studies takes over the role of being the one that secures a referent 
object. “States have been the central actors in international affairs,”461 therefore, it is 
obvious that the state takes over the role as the actor. The state has the ability to act 
through its government or through other agents. “A state must sustain security against 
external threats, such as other states and other international actors such as terrorists. It 
must also maintain security against internal threats to its character, rule, or territorial and 
demographic integrity.”462 As described in the section below (referent objects) over time 
other actors, next to the state, were also seen as to be able to take over this role. The 
Copenhagen School further explains that an actor acts as such, when issues are securitized 
“by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened.”463  
 
                                                          
459
 Collins 2007, p. 2 
460 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 21 
461 Morgan 2007, p. 14 
462
 Morgan 2007, p. 14 
463 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 36 
108 
 
5.1.3 Referent object 
The question, which needs to be asked in order to figure out who or what the referent 
object is: Who or what is to be secured? In the very beginning of Security Studies, as a 
separate field, the only valid referent object was the state. “[S]ecurity refers to protecting 
the state from external threats, and the people living within the territory of the state are 
considered secure to the degree that the state is secure.”464 That the state was the only 
referent object was not questioned until Security Studies started to evolve after the end of 
the Cold War. As it will be explained later on, the concept of security was broadened and 
widened after the Cold War, and other subjects were able to serve as referent objects. The 
concept developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde defines five different sectors, which can 
serve as referent objects. These include the military sector, political, economic, societal and 
environmental sectors. By defining these five sectors, they intended to follow the general 
trend in widening the fields of referent objects. But limiting it to these five sectors was 
necessary in order to avoid a too general list, which would include all possible aspects that 
could become referent objects. By creating a too general definition the theory might run 
danger of not being accepted among scientists due to its general character.   
 
5.2 Development of Security Studies 
5.2.1 The birth of Security Studies  
Knowing the origin of the subject, which is to be discussed, is an undeniable essence for a 
better understanding of the field one studies. Not only does it provide important 
background knowledge, it can also help to explain the influences certain developments had 
on the field of interest, how certain variables are connected with each other and, more 
importantly, interact with each other.  
Security Studies, as a separate field of studies, evolved in the aftermath of World War II in 
the United States and “grew out of debates over how to protect the state against external 
and internal threats … both distinguishing International Security Studies (ISS465) from earlier 
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thinking and the disciplines of War Studies and Military History, and, as it evolved, serving as 
the linking concept connecting an increasingly diverse set of research programmes.”466 Soon, 
Security Studies, which actually started off as an independent field, were subsumed under 
the field of International Relations (IR) and mainly discussed in the Western World.467  
Security Studies ultimately developed on the basis of War Studies with On War by Carl von 
Clausewitz often referred to as the founder of this science. In his sequence of books On War, 
Clausewitz wrote about the experiences he gathered during the Napoleonic Wars as a 
member of the Prussian military, and later on as a member of the Russian-German Legion. 
On War was the first approach to connect war to greater means than just battles; his 
definition of war is widely known and accepted among students of ISS and tries to explain 
that “[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of 
political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”468 
What made Security Studies different from its predecessor and legitimized it as a separate 
sub-field in IR is summed up by Buzan and Hansen in three points. First, discussing security 
as the key concept, instead of defense or war, a “broader set of political issues, including the 
importance of societal cohesion and the relationship between military and non-military 
threats and vulnerabilities” could be dealt with. Second, ISS dealt with problems surfacing 
after World War II, such as the Cold War and nuclear weapons, which, due to its novelty, 
could not have been discussed before. And third, “ISS was much more a civilian enterprise 
than most earlier military and strategic literatures.”469 
During the early years of the Cold War most of the research was preoccupied with strategy 
which again generated the field of Strategic Studies. “Strategy is a part of Security Studies, 
just as Security Studies are part of International Relations, which itself is part of political 
science.”470 Its heydays were during the Cold War, were most of the research was 
preoccupied with strategy. But it was never considered an independent discipline, rather a 
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sub discipline, well connected with Security Studies. The period of the Cold War was marked 
by “political leaders, government officials, and academics interested in security issues (who) 
wrestled with the problems of how to survive and prosper in the nuclear age.” Therefore, 
Strategic Studies dealt with a field in which “power had to be exercised in a way that 
promoted the interests of the state, while at the same time avoiding a conflict which would 
lead to the destruction not only of the states involved but of civilization as a whole. This 
predicament gave rise to the theories of deterrence, limited war and arms control that 
dominated the literature of Strategic Studies (and indeed International Relations) during the 
period from the 1950s to the 1980s.”471 
The period from the 1950s to the 1980s is, as mentioned above, often seen as the climax of 
Strategic Studies. After the end of the Cold War and the (more or less) peaceful dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Strategic Studies, which were mostly based on deterrence, lost part of 
its basis.  
Two theoretical approaches, also referred to as the traditional approaches in the literature, 
dominated not only Security Studies, but also IR starting in 1945 until the end of the Cold 
War. On the one and more dominant side, there was realism and on the other side 
liberalism. These approaches are referred to “as traditional approaches because they 
underpinned Security Studies for much of our thinking during the previous century; they 
remain, though, hugely influential and just because they are labeled traditional does not 
mean they have been replace by more recent thinking.”472 Each of these two theories has 
created a number of sub-divisions with different characteristics in itself, but this is not the 
place to discuss the development of these traditional approaches in great detail and length. 
Rather, it is the goal to present an overview of them in order to be able to further discuss 
the developments, which (amongst others) ultimately lead to the foundation of the 
Copenhagen School in the 1990s.   
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5.2.2 Realism 
The theory of realism in the sector of IR has produced an uncountable number of books 
discussing that approach, which tries to determine how IR works. Niccolò Machiavelli and 
Thomas Hobbes are both seen as realists and their works, The Prince (Il Principe) by 
Machiavelli and Leviathan by Hobbes, are always referred to when one tries to explain 
realism.473 Respected realists in the twentieth century are for example Hans Morgenthau, 
George Kennan, John Herz, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Henry Kissinger. Realism 
was particularly influential in the United States and was rather dominant after World War II. 
At this point in time, “realism seemed to offer a more coherent and accurate account of the 
world than the liberal ideas it critiqued.”474 
Donnelly states that, “*t+he core of realism lies in the conjunction of anarchy and egoism and 
the resulting imperatives of power politics.”475 The international order, viewed by realists, is 
anarchic, because of “the absence of any ultimate power and authority over states.”476 
“Anarchy assures the centrality of struggle for power ‘even in the absence of aggressivity or 
similar factors’.”477  
The international order is seen as something which Hobbes describes in his book Leviathan 
as a war of all against all. Following this logic, “*e]ach (state) must arrange for protection 
itself. This makes military strength to cope with possible attacks the most vital kind of 
power. Therefore states are natural competitors for relative military power, and accordingly 
competitor for things that build military power – wealth, natural resources, strategically 
valuable positions, technology, population.”478  
During the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and USSR in a bipolar world 
order was dominated by increasing ones military power and, therefore, the time, in which 
“realism became the dominant theory of IR, offering a conception of the world which 
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seemed to define the ‘common sense’ of the subject.”479 This time also produced the 
security dilemma480 and the concept of the balance of power.481 Both concepts fall under the 
category of realism and are products that were created to explain and provide a better 
understanding of realist thinking.  
Another characteristic of realism is that it sees cooperation between states as something 
impossible. Morgan writes that, “*s]ince international politics is basically rivalry, conflict, and 
insecurity, realists insist that true cooperation, especially among major states, is rare, 
particularly on security-related matters.”482 He provides four reasons for this kind of 
behavior of states. The first one is that states weigh their own autonomy and sovereignty as 
too important which would experience cut offs in case of a cooperation with one other or 
several states. Second, states tend to cheat in order to get a better pay off compared to 
others. Third, for any party involved, a cooperation could mean less benefits for one state 
than for another and, therefore, the one state with fewer benefits is not likely to agree to a 
cooperation in order to prevent benefits for some other state. Fourth, it is unlikely that 
states agree to cooperate if benefits are not visible immediate.483 
As the five principles of realism, Filzmaier et al. cite Hans Morgenthau and name the 
following to define realism. First, politics and society are dominated by objective rules which 
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are in the human nature - to gain more power means an increase in security. Second, it is 
natural for a state to pursue power and not to follow moral standards. International power 
means the real or theoretical possibility to push ones interests, whether with military or 
economic means. Third, common moral rules are not applicable; a state has to act rational. 
Fourth, politics follows inherent laws and, fifth, the moral pursuit of a state can never 
become a moral law for all.484 
Morgenthau also was of the opinion “that international relations is about states pursuing 
interests defined in terms of power.” A state in this case is not “the only actor but … it is the 
most significant actor,” these “states behave in accordance with these interests,” and 
“whatever else states seek, they seek power in order to achieve other goals. The need for 
power stems from the anarchical nature of the international system.”485 
Since core values of realism disappeared with the end of the Cold War, it was questioned 
whether this theory was still relevant. Additionally, it was questioned how important can a 
theory be to begin with if it is possible for it to become obsolete within a relative short 
timeframe. Realism accounts for the changes in 1989/90 and was exposed to a lot of 
critique. Donnelly opposes this by stating that, “*r+ealism is a theory ‘tuned’ to explaining 
constancy. Realists are more impressed by the repeated occurrence of certain patterns 
across time than by the undeniable historical and cultural diversity of actors and interactions 
in international relations. They emphasize constancy not accidentally but by self-conscious 
theoretical choice.”486 
Other problems, with which the realist analysis had to fight with, surfaced after the end of 
the Cold War. Morgan identified the following points as difficult for realism. After all realism 
explains that a state can only collapse after an external loss, this statement is not true for 
the end of the Cold War. It “collapsed due to internal developments in communist states. 
Instead of collapse due to a great war or other systemic pressures, or a sharp decline in 
communist governments’ relative military power, it  was because of a failure of rule and of 
their attempts at cooperation among themselves. … Next, realists see states as constantly 
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worried about their survival. Yet with myriads of small weak governments around, the 
durability of states is very high. … Many realists expected the end of the Cold War to result in 
some version of multipolarity. Instead it brought American hegemony, which has yet to 
provoke the responses realism would expect. … Another serious problem is persistently 
greater cooperation than a realist might expect. A premier example is the deepening and 
enlargement of European integration.”487 
In its defense, Donnelly writes that “*r]ealism simply cannot explain the vast majority of 
what happens in international relations.” He, though, argues that, “the most important 
things” have been explained by it (realism), and that, nevertheless, “*r+ealism must be an 
important, even essential, part of a pluralistic discipline of international studies.” 488 Realism 
is still the dominant theory, and even if critics of realism “have been increasingly effective 
over the years, it is difficult to deny the fact that realism still, in one form or another, 
provides the dominant mode of discourse in the discipline.”489 
 
5.2.3 Liberalism 
Next to realism was liberalism the other dominant theory in IR. Bruchill describes liberalism 
as “a theory which champions scientific rationality, freedom and the inevitability of human 
progress. It is an approach to government which emphasizes individual rights, 
constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on the power of the state. It is also a model of 
economic organization, which argues that market capitalism best promotes the welfare of all 
by most efficiently allocating scarce resources within society.”490 
Prominent thinkers in the field of liberalism are Immanuel Kant, Robert Koehane, Joseph 
Nye, Michael Walzer and Francis Fukuyama. Whereas realism dominated the studies of IR in 
the United States, was the theory of liberalism more successful in Europe.491 Obviously, 
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liberalism also developed numerous side-strands, which are not subject of discussion here. 
Rather it is the intention to give an overview of liberalism as a theory in IR.  
Starting in the early 1970s, Hyde-Price notes that realism in its form, in which it had existed 
until then, was challenged “by neoliberal institutionalism, or simply liberal institutionalism. 
This accepted many realist assumptions (notably the anarchic nature of the international 
system) but rejected its conclusions. In particular, liberal institutionalists stressed the 
potential for international cooperation, especially through multilateralism and institutional 
integration. Their focus on the emergence of complex interdependence also led them to 
highlight the importance of the economic and political dimensions of the international 
system, and thus to move away from realism’s concentration on power politics and military 
force. Associated with this was the recognition of the growing role of non-state actors in the 
international system.”492 
Whereas realists portray a bipolar world order in which no power above the level of nation 
states exists and cooperation is impossible, liberalists very much believe in the cooperation 
of nation states. Unlike realism, where war and a constant struggle for survival and more 
power are considered the normal order, “*f+or liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. … 
War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of 
some peculiarity of human nature.”493 These differences might help to explain why “*t+he 
demise of Soviet Communism at the beginning of the 1990s enhanced the influence of 
liberal theories of international relations… .”494 
What realists and liberalists have in common is that they both treat “states as primary actors 
in an international politics characterized by elements of anarchy. … Liberalists tend to treat 
the state as less important in itself – governments are major actors but typically this is in 
their capacity as agents for domestic groups.”495 Having the state act as a primary actor in 
common is one thing, but it is part of liberalist thinking to say that domestic order explains 
the behavior of foreign policy. This so called ‘inside-out’ approach is another differentiation 
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to describe demarcations between liberalism and realism. In realist thinking, the ‘outside-in’ 
approach dominates, which sees foreign affairs influencing domestic order.496 
“The liberalist perspective puts considerable emphasis on state survival, less on autonomy. 
Its adherents expect the emergence of and usually support arrangements that curtail state 
autonomy but enhance development, including international interactions that promote 
development even if they erode sovereignty.”497 State survival and general peace can be 
achieved, in a liberalist point of view, by the promotion of democracy and free trade.  
It is a common view of liberalists that “liberal democracies are unique in their ability and 
willingness to establish peaceful relations among themselves.”498 Democracies have, as far 
as history is concerned, not gone to war with each other and have been able to establish 
relationships that pay off for the states and their people. It does not mean, though, that 
democracies do not “make war with non-democratic states, … democracies maintain a 
healthy appetite for conflicts with authoritarian states.”499 Therefore, liberalists consider it 
important to further promote the spread of democracy. This line of argumentation 
(democracy brings peace in terms of absence of war) is challenged by others who “believe 
the correlation between democracy and the absence of war is spurious, that some third 
factor is responsible for the absence of war among democracies. … (And) that modern 
democracies simply share common interests and similar basic perspectives and values. 
Hence their disagreements are not serious enough to fight about and they make natural 
allies. This, not democracy, is the key variable.”500 
Besides democracy, the other factor that guarantees state survival in liberalism is free trade. 
“According to Kant, unhindered commerce between the peoples of the world would unite 
them in a common, peaceful enterprise.”501 Burchill argues further in his article about 
liberalism that free trade helps a nation to become wealthy, borders become obsolete and 
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people develop a sense of one common community. Additionally, free trade spreads 
understanding for one another and friendship in this community.502 People in this 
community would then no longer support their states if they went to war with each other. 
Not only because of this evolving community would war become obsolete to people, but 
also because war would be bad for business. Moreover, people would then see “warfare as 
disruptive, expansive, and destructive in terms of their interests. War was bad for business, 
and capitalist expansion was demonstrating that war was no longer necessary for national 
development.”503 Rather growing business, for which free trade is inevitable, can increase 
national development and wealth. Free trade also increases “*i+nterdependence (and) would 
replace national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal 
retaliation.”504 An example often referred to in this context is the successful project of 
European integration. A project that started off by promoting free trade and, by doing so, 
created interdependence among states, which has brought them closer together and 
established a zone of safety, security and stability. Burchill cites Mitrany in his text, who 
argues that a ‘spill over’ effect from technical areas would be achieved “into other funct ional 
areas where states found that mutual advantages could be gained.”505 
As liberalism was portrayed here, it cannot be denied that this theory has had experienced 
an increase in its relevance in the past two decades. “The liberalist approach is currently the 
dominant perspective in the practice of international politics.”506 As such, it has been 
influential to many fields, but still, realism has not been dismissed and both theories are up 
to this point relevant as they are “*t+he most influential theoretical  and prescriptive 
approaches on security in international politics.”507 
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5.2.4 Comeback of Security Studies 
Not only did the years from 1989-1991 have tremendous impact on the political world order. 
The end of the Cold War and the well known settings until its end also influenced theories of 
IR. With less focus on strategic studies and traditional studies in IR there was room again for 
different and new developments in this area. Nevertheless, both fields were still part of the 
development and not simply dismissed after the end of the Cold War. But “Security Studies 
has re-emerged and core assumptions about what is to be secured, and how, have come to 
occupy our thoughts.”508  
Security Studies has been of great interest in the past two decades, and “*m+uch of this 
debate has revolved around four questions, the two most important are: What is the 
referent object of security? What is the nature of the threat? The two supplementary 
questions are: Who provides security? With what instruments can security be provided?”509 
A widening process took place concerning the referent object. Was it so far only the state 
which needed to be secured, were now other objects added to this list; objects such as the 
economy, the environment and the human as an individual, for example. Also the number of 
issues that were perceived as a threat increased. Was it only the military power of another 
state, in the earlier days, all of a sudden also pandemics (e.g. AIDS) and environmental issues 
were seen as problems, which might jeopardize a state’s security.510 This shift from 
traditional security issues (e.g. coercive diplomacy) to non-traditional security issues (e.g. 
AIDS, transnational organized crime) has opened up the field for new subjects.511 
This widening process and shift, towards the inclusion of non-traditional security issues, did 
not only have positive impacts, it also harbored problems. The most relevant was that it 
became very difficult for Security Studies to set clear boundaries on what was relevant for 
the subject and what was not. “The problem with this all-encompassing approach is that 
security, if it is defined so broadly that it embraces all aspects of human existence, ends up 
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being about everything and nothing.”512 A consequence of this for Security Studies might  
then be that it ends up not being useful anymore and eventually becomes obsolete.  
In the following chapter, the so-called Copenhagen School will be discussed with its concept 
of securitization. It is an approach that left traditional security issues behind and integrated 
non-traditional security issues into its concept. Needless to say, it is not a flawless 
approach513 but it is the designated theoretical approach in this work. 
 
5.3 The Copenhagen School  
The book Security: A New Framework for Analysis, published in 1998, started the 
development of the so called Copenhagen School. The authors Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and 
Jaap de Wilde, who were all representatives from the Conflict and Peace Research Institute 
of Copenhagen at that time, claim that their book is “a genuinely joint enterprise, with all of 
the authors making substantial inputs into every chapter.”514 Another work that had 
significant impact on this book was People, States and Fear by Buzan, published in 1983. It 
first laid out some of the ideas that were then further elaborated in Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, the post Cold War period in Security Studies was marked by a 
widening and deepening of the subject and the issues studied. The authors of Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis tried to come up with a concept that met the requirements of 
these new developments. To integrate new security issues and additionally set out rules that 
create borders, in order to avoid the integration of random issues into the concept and, 
subsequently limiting the area of study, was the aim. With their book, the authors also try to 
set “out a new and comprehensive framework of analysis for security studies. … And it offers 
a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that 
of politicization – for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions.”515 
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Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde start their approach by defining their understanding of 
security. According to them, “security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as 
posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, 
the state, incorporating government, territory, and society).”516 With this definition in mind, 
they identify the following sectors as security issues: the military sector (considered the 
traditional security issues), the political sector, the economic sector, and the societal as well 
as the environmental sector.  
Each of these five sectors, mentioned above, is determined by the securitizing actor and the 
referent object. Securitizing actors are seen as “actors who securitize issues by declaring 
something – a referent object – existentially threatened.”517 Usually, the “securitizing actor 
is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. … Their argument will 
normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or 
some other larger community, principle, or system.”518 
Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival.”519 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde say that, “the referent object 
for security has traditionally been the state” but “*i+n principle, securitizing actors can 
attempt to construct anything as a referent object.”520 So it is not solely the state and its 
“physical safety, autonomy, development, and rule,”521 but for example also HIV/AIDS 
among other pandemics, migration, and environment, have been included into this group.
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5.3.1 Securitization  
The Copenhagen School argues that virtually any matter can be made a security issue. 
“Depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum.”522 This 
spectrum523 includes parts that are nonpoliticized, those that become politicized, and some 
out of them end up being securitized.  
Nonpoliticized means that “the state does not deal with it (an issue) and it is not in any other 
way made an issue of public debate and decision.”524 The next step on the spectrum means 
that an issue is politicized if it “is part of public policy, requiring government decision and 
resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance.” 525 The 
final step on this spectrum is reached when an issue is being securitized.  It means that an 
“issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying 
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”526 An issue can be securitized 
and, furthermore, be put at the end of that spectrum, by any securitizing actor. Securitizing 
actors (defined earlier) can be “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and 
pressure groups.”527 In order to respond to existential threats, the securitizing actor needs to 
adopt extraordinary means. Extraordinary means are described as a right “to break the 
normal political rules of game.”528 “Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules 
(which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but 
by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.”529  
In other words, a politicized issue needs to be articulated as an existential threat by a 
securitizing actor to be called an issue that is securitized. A securitization can then be called 
a success if three prerequisites are fulfilled. Thus are, according to the authors Buzan, 
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Wæver and de Wilde, “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit 
relations by breaking free of rules.”530  
“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act.” 531 The 
speech act is “defined as the discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential 
threat to security.”532 Even though the issue, tackled by the securitizing actor, is interpreted 
as an existential threat, it is not relevant whether one utters security, but “the acceptance of 
that designation (the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action) by 
significant audience”533 is important and relevant.  
Another way to see whether securitization of an issue has been a success is, when this issue 
pushes nearly all other issues aside. The integrity of the referent object is a priority, 
compared to any other issues and, consequently, has to be handled as a number one 
priority.534 
The Copenhagen School claims that it is impossible to say whether a security issue is an 
objective or a subjective threat. Security issues cannot be successfully measured since there 
are no theories that would support such a statement.535 According to that logic, it is also not 
possible to state whether securitization of an issue which is perceived as an existential threat 
is a positive or negative thing to do, since almost any issue can be securitized if an 
acceptance by the audience is the consequence of the securitizing actor’s speech act. What 
the authors though say is that securitization is “a failure to deal with issues as normal 
politics. … In some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced 
with an implacable or barbarian aggressor.”536 
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This point, just discussed, is one aspect that the Copenhagen School does not try to answer, 
whether a referent object was ever really threatened or endangered. There is no theory that 
would provide a solid framework for such a statement. Despite that, the concept of 
securitization of the Copenhagen School can say whether an issue has successfully been 
securitized by an actor, or not.  
What do critics say about the approach of the Copenhagen School? Some argue that the 
approach is too Eurocentric. Developed in Europe and greatly influenced by the experience 
the authors gathered here, makes it difficult to be reasonably applied to other geographic 
regions. Moreover, the boundaries of securitization and politicization are criticized as not 
clear enough and too blurred, which makes it complicated to isolate these two steps on the 
securitization spectrum.537 Hyde-Price sees the securitization model as a useful tool to study 
one feature of Security Studies, but according to him, “*i+t cannot provide the foundations 
for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline.”538 
 
5.4 Case Studies 
The following section is put together by the case studies of the two historical events, 
discussed in great length earlier in this work. It examines whether the dissolution of Eastern 
Europe, in particular the relationship with Hungary, and EU membership were treated as 
security issue; whether these incidents were treated as existential threats to Austria’s 
security, and whether extraordinary measures were taken in order to fight against these 
threats will also being discussed. Additionally, this chapter is intended to connect the single 
sections of this work so far and apply the theory discussed below to the historic events.  
By applying the concept of securitization of the Copenhagen School to the two previous 
mentioned events, the Foreign Ministry, with Alois Mock as head in the position of Foreign 
Minister, acted as the securitizing actor. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde it is 
important to see, “*w+ho can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what 
conditions, and with what effects?”539 The person here that could ‘do’ security was the 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, namely Alois Mock. In his role as Minister, he had the necessary 
resources available in order to be heard by a proper audience (e.g. via Parliament, news, 
etc.). The issues that were chosen were of great importance to the Foreign Ministry and to 
Mock as well, and were presented and given the stage to address concerns about these 
particular issues. The conditions under which they were presented are described in great 
length earlier in this work. In the following section, whether or not the securitization was 
successful, or if an issue was even elevated from the politicized spectrum to the 
securitization spectrum, are examined and explained. 
 
5.4.1 Securitization during the Dissolution of Eastern Europe  
Austria was very much influenced by the sudden and unexpected changes in Eastern Europe 
in 1989. Geographically located at the Eastern end of the Western World, it was obvious that 
for Austria the impacts were much more real than for other states, which were not 
bordering the countries under former Soviet influence.  
The ever present uncertainty dominated discussions at that time. This disintegration of the 
bipolar world order had never been seen before and certainly no ‘protocol’ existed on how 
to best handle such a situation. Furthermore, at the very beginning of the revolution, it was 
not clear whether the USSR would use military force or not to keep the freedom pursuing 
countries under its influence. However, it soon became obvious that they were not going to 
use any force, as had happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. One factor, 
though, that was perceived as a threat to a certain degree, was the fast growing number of 
people crossing the border to Austria.  
Migration is among the group of non-traditional security issues within the field of Security 
Studies. It has been included among security issues, during a widening and deepening 
process of Security Studies took place after the Cold War. The referent object in this 
particular case is the political stability (political sector) in Austria. If Austria were not able to 
deal with the increasing number of (illegal) migrants, it could further undermine the 
authority of the government and, therefore, threaten the political integrity of the country.  
One of the main motivations for migration is the prospect of a better life with better 
opportunities somewhere else. As mentioned in the chapter on “The years following the 
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Annus Mirabilis”, migration developed to a security issue to some degree. Emmers defines 
migration as something that “can be articulated by politicians and perceived by specific 
audiences as representing a threat to the political, societal, economical as well as cultural 
security of a state and its society.”540 
As noted earlier, in the concept of securitization by the Copenhagen School, the spectrum of 
securitization has three different stages. Until a security issue is seen as securitized, it first 
has to be elevated from the non-politicized level on to the politicized level. The issue of 
migration had clearly moved out of the non-politicized sphere at an early stage. Very soon, 
in 1989, it became obvious that the number of people crossing the eastern border of Austria 
increased tremendously, and that this fact could not just be ignored. The issue was 
discussed, as mentioned earlier, in Parliament. To put it differently, the state, in terms of the 
government, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in particular, dealt with it.  
The criteria for an issue to be politicized are that the “issue is part of public policy, requiring 
government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of 
communal governance.”541 Migration can be seen as part of public policy. As stated above, 
the topic was discussed in Parliament by the Foreign Minister as well as by other Members 
of Parliament. Decisions were taken by the government when system changes were made by 
the Interior Minister, who was responsible for that specific matter. One measure, as an 
example, was the reintroduction of visas for certain citizens (Romanians). Whether resource 
allocations or communal governance took place in Austria during the changes undergone in 
the countries under former Soviet influence cannot be said by the information provided so 
far, and it would be wrong to simply take assumptions based on that information. 
Regardless, it is legitimate to say that the issue was securitized.  
A successful securitization requires certain elements, such as the presentation as an 
existential threat, emergency measures, and when “an audience tolerate*s+ violations of 
rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.”542 Never during Mock’s term in office was 
migration articulated as an existential threat. It was seen as a security issue, which could 
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trouble the societal and political sector. In fact, it was more important to help the people, 
improve their situation at home, to not have them leave their home country to begin with 
and to support them. However, one emergency measure was taken. The Austrian army was 
sent to the border to assist the regular border control and to further protect Austria from 
illegal migration. From an Austrian point of view, this particular measure was not just a 
normal reaction to an event. The positioning of military personal at the border can be 
interpreted as an emergency measure that has lasted until 15 December 2011.Even though 
extraordinary measures were taken, the main requirement for a security issue to be 
securitized, namely to be presented as an existential threat, did not occur.  
As explained earlier, an issue is only successfully securitized when all necessary 
requirements are fulfilled. The analysis here tried to elaborate whether the security issue of 
migration was successfully securitized or not. As has been proven, the issue was lifted on to 
the level of securitization. However, it only fulfilled most of requirements necessary for a 
complete securitization; it lacks one main claim, which is a necessity as Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde point it out in their concept, namely the lack of calling migration an existential 
threat. The absence of just this one prerequisite is proof enough to conclude that the issue 
was only partly securitized and that migration was not considered an existential threat.  
 
5.4.2 Securitization in the Process of Becoming an EU-Member 
At first, one might wonder why EU membership is discussed in this context, but it is easily 
explained. As already described, the integrity of a state may be harmed not only if its 
physical safety is at stake, but a state’s security can also be hindered if its autonomy and the 
rule of law are no longer guaranteed. Opponents of Austria attaining EU membership feared 
that a loss of sovereignty could become a security issue for the state. On the contrary, the 
main threat, the Foreign Ministry argued, was that Austria would miss its chance of 
becoming a member. This possibility was seen as a great risk for Austria. Hence, this section 
deals with the question of whether a successful securitization took place in this case, or not. 
The referent objects in this context are, for that particular analysis, sovereignty (political 
sector) and Austria’s economy (economic sector). 
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First, the argument is addressed as to whether Austria’s security was perceived as 
threatened, in connection with autonomy and the rule of law. The opponents of EU 
membership argued that Austria would lose its sovereignty. By becoming a member of the 
European Union, some power was surrendered to decision makers beyond the nation state 
and has the ability to make decisions to which Austria would be bound. On the other hand, it 
was also the opinion, supported by the Foreign Ministry, that decisions of the EU would 
directly affect Austria, whether or not it joined the EU. In particular if it would continue to 
collaborate with the EU as an EFTA member but would be left out of the EU decision-making 
process. Austria would be able to offer its viewpoints, and may even be heard in some cases, 
but it would not be given a vote in the decision-making process. Being left out in the 
decision-making process would have meant a much greater loss of sovereignty than actual 
membership. By becoming an EU member, Austria could influence EU decisions in a positive 
way, and would be able to work against the loss of sovereignty, which again would neither 
threaten Austria’s sovereignty, nor its security.543 Other facts that spoke against the loss of 
sovereignty were, for example, that Austria took part in numerous sessions held by EU 
bodies as an observer. This was an opportunity for Austria to familiarize itself with the 
procedures in a transition phase.544 The successive adjustment into the procedures of the EU 
could also be seen as an increase of sovereignty, since Austria did not have to work and 
function in the system from one day to another, by 1 January 1995. Instead it had a chance 
to adapt to the change gradually. Additionally, the White Paper, which was published by the 
government, can be seen as preparing Austrians as well as maintaining Austria’s influence. 
Additionally, the negative consequences that non-participation in the EU could have for 
Austria’s economy were seen as threatening.  
Back to the three levels of securitization the initial argument discussed here. They are 
applied now to the security issue of Austria not joining the EU in 1995. The issue of EU 
membership can be located at the politicized spectrum of the concept of securitization. 
Membership to the EU and its predecessor, the EC, was a political issue in Austria for a long 
time, even before the actual membership application in 1989. It was an issue that was dealt 
with on bilateral basis as well as in connection with the EFTA. As soon as the application was 
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handed over, preparations for the actual membership negotiations began. Furthermore the 
issue started to become more publicly discussed and, moreover, lots of government 
decisions needed to be made in that context. To name only a few examples among many, 
the government needed to agree on who would be in charge of the negotiations. Next to 
that was it important to reach consensus on several issues that had to be negotiated before 
a membership. Such issues were for instance Austria’s position on its neutrality, the matter 
of second homes, and the transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles.  
For these reasons, it can be said that the issue of a potential non-membership was 
politicized. Next, if the level of securitization on the spectrum was reached it can be analyzed 
whether or not the issue was securitized. According to the definition of Buzan, Wæver, and 
de Wilde for a securitized issue, “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring 
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure.”545 
Potential non-membership was, definitely, formulated as an existential threat to Austria’s 
security by Foreign Minister Mock. His line of argument was the following: Mock was 
convinced that if Austria missed its chance to become a member in the Union by 1995, it 
would, sooner or later, make another attempt to be included into the exclusive club. At this 
time, Austria was in a relatively good position; it was a stable and rather wealthy country 
that was welcomed by the EU, especially since Austria would be a net contributor. Nobody 
would be able to predict which role the country would play in another 10 to 15 years and if 
Austria had to apply again for EU membership at a later point, it might submit its application 
together with the countries under former Soviet influence. This could mean that Austria 
would be lumped together with these countries, which might have to offer less to the EU 
than Austria had. No one would know for sure, but this could have tremendous negative 
impacts on its position during the negotiations. This possible scenario was reason enough for 
Mock to take any necessary action so that Austria could become a member in 1995. 
Additionally, other threats and security issues were seen in the possible non-participation in 
the integration process. One reason was that Austria would be left out when major 
developments took place, and more importantly, it could not participate in the decision-
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making process. Austria would become a country that had to play by the rules the EU set 
out, but without any chance to change these rules, and as a small country it would always 
depend on partnerships with EU members. Besides, it would be denied participation in the 
Internal Market, which would have a negative effect on Austria’s economy, as was 
extensively discussed earlier.  
Furthermore, it is required to analyze whether emergency measures were taken, and 
whether actions outside the normal bounds were taken. During the whole accession process, 
the government did not take any emergency measures. The same can to be said for the 
other prerequisite. One might argue that the referendum, which was held in Austria in 1994, 
could be seen as such an emergency action. Even though it is right to say that this 
referendum was outside of the normal bounds of procedure, it is only a democratic tool 
hardly used in Austria. It was, however, a legally correct action, within the legal framework 
of the Austrian constitution.  
Since only one of the prerequisites of securitization is fulfilled in the present analysis, it again 
cannot be stated that the issue of a potential non-membership was successfully securitized. 
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue though that, “security is about priority, about elevating 
issues to absolute priority. ... [I]f an issue has not pushed almost all other issues aside, it has 
not been fully securitized.”546 Without hesitation, it can be said that the EU membership 
issue did most certainly push all other matters aside. The matter was definitely a priority in 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and very dominant in its workload. As was mentioned earlier, 
this can be seen by simply looking at the index of the Annual Report published by the 
ministry. After the dissolution of Eastern Europe, the upcoming EU negotiations and the 
possible EU membership were the main workload of the ministry.  
To summarize, a comprehensive securitization did not take place on this issue, since a 
number of prerequisites could not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, a partial securitization did take 
place by declaring the case of non-membership as an existential threat. It can be argued that 
this threat, to miss this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, was understood as such perceived by 
the Austrian people. This might be one factor that helps explain the high support for EU 
membership, which was achieved in the referendum. Regardless, the creation of an 
                                                          
546 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 176 
130 
 
existential threat did not lead to the breaking of any rules and, thus, the criteria for a 
successful securitization were not fulfilled.  
 
5.5 Summary  
The concept of securitization, as it was developed by the Copenhagen School, applied to the 
two events of the dissolution of Eastern Europe and to Austria’s EU membership reveals 
interesting findings. Even though both events had not been successfully securitized in the 
understanding of this concept, both affairs included elements that made them security 
issues, be it migration in the case of Eastern Europe, or potential non-participation in the EU. 
At the same time there was never a need to take any real emergency measures or to take 
actions outside the normal bounds. Still, Austria was able to deal with these issues in a way 
that they were no longer seen as security issues. In the case of migration, legal actions were 
taken to change the laws. Concerning EU membership, the hard negotiations with a positive 
outcome for Austria and the highly successful referendum resolved the issue by joining the 
EU.  
That these issues were not securitized can be seen as a positive achievement for the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, as well as for Mock. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that “*b]asically, 
security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.”547 
According to this interpretation, Foreign Minister Alois Mock was better off by not 
securitizing these two issues. He was able to deal with them within normal politics. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
“May you live in interesting times”, is a well known Chinese curse that is frequently used for 
times that, on the one hand, are interesting to live in, but on the other painful, if not 
disastrous.  
The time while Alois Mock was Foreign Minister can undeniably be described as interesting, 
but not as the Chinese curse implicates. His time in office was not only marked by cruel, but 
also by peaceful and interesting occurrences; the cruelties and crimes, committed during the 
War in the former Yugoslavia cannot be denied and was an event where one cannot begin to 
describe the damage it brought to the people and will bring to the future generations. 
Unfortunately, this war, as mentioned during the introduction, could not be covered here. 
Due to its complexity, it would have exceeded the scope of this work, and it would not have 
been possible to discuss the topic in its full extent.  
Besides the War in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, there were also other, more pleasant 
and interesting events, such as the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and Austria’s  
accession to the European Union. Alois Mock had been involved and familiar with these two 
topics from very early on. Working as a young man in politics gave him the opportunity to 
follow the developments and see where things were going. This knowledge was the 
background he needed to become a rather successful politician.  
The two events discussed above were of great significance for Austrian contemporary 
history. Both brought along major changes, as well as opportunities, for the country. The 
analysis of these events, with the help of the theory of securitization by the Copenhagen 
School, provided information for answering the hypothesis formulated in the very beginning. 
This hypothesis sought to answer the question whether the issues were seen as security 
issues, or not. In conclusion both matters were seen as security issues. When focusing on 
Hungary and the dissolution of Eastern Europe, the issue of migration, which was perceived 
as a security issue. Therefore, it formed a threat to the societal and political spectrum. In the 
case of EU membership, it was argued that a potential non-membership was perceived as a 
threat to the political and the economical sector.  
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In answering the second part of the hypothesis, it can be stated that in both cases a 
complete and successful securitization did not take place. Some of the prerequisites, defined 
by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, could not be fulfilled. In simpler terms, a partial 
securitization took place, but not a comprehensive and, therefore, successful one.  
As already said, it was not a bad sign for a politician, in this case for Alois Mock, that the 
issues were not successfully securitized. With his ability as a politician, he was able to 
manage these situations using normal politics, which often requires more courage and 
knowledge. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde interpret security as a failure of normal politics, as 
something negative. All in all, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under Alois Mock did react 
with reasonable measures since both incidents were not fully securitized.  
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1 Mock and Horn meet at the border to cut through the Iron Curtain 
 
 
Source: http://members.aon.at/roemersteinarena/Mock&Horn27.6.1989.jpg 
 
7.2 Signing the Accession Treaty 
 
 
Source: http://www.alois-
mock.at/leben/artikel.asp?where=fotogalleries&gallery=507&foto=1&link=mai
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7.3 Securitization spectrum  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emmers 2007, p. 112
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8. Abbreviations 
 
CEI – Central European Initiative 
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy  
COMECON – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
EAEC – European Atomic Energy Community 
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community 
EC – European Community 
EDU – European Democrat Union 
EEA – European Economic Area 
EEC – European Economic Community 
EFTA – European Free Trade Association 
EU – European Union  
EUCDA – European Christian Democrat Workers 
FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party 
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency 
IDU – International Democratic Union 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IR – International Relations 
ISS – International Security Studies 
JVP – Young People’s Party 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
ÖAAB – Österreichischer Arbeitnehmerinnen- und Arbeitnehmerbund (The ÖAAB is part of 
the ÖVP, and as a sub-organization represents the interest of employees.) 
ÖVP – Austrian People’s Party 
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SEA – Single European Act 
SPÖ – Socialist Party of Austria (from 1945-1991) and Social Democratic Party of Austria 
(from 1991-present) 
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
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10. Abstracts 
10.1 Abstract German 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt Österreichs Außenpolitik zwischen 1987 und 1995. In 
diesem Zeitraum war Dr. Alois Mock Außenminister, aus dieser Position heraus konnte er 
Österreichs Außenpolitik wesentlich beeinflussen. Um Mock besser als den Politiker zu 
verstehen, als den ihn viele kennen, ist es wichtig einen Blick auf sein Leben und seine 
politische Karriere zu werfen. Im Untersuchungszeitraum werden zwei Schwerpunkte 
behandelt. Der erste Schwerpunkt ist die sich verändernde Beziehung zwischen Österreich 
und Ungarn. Waren die beiden Nachbarländer zu Beginn von Mocks Amtszeit noch durch 
den Eisernen Vorhang voneinander getrennt, konnten sie ihre freundschaftlichen 
Beziehungen nach 1989 wieder aufbauen und Österreich war darum bemüht das neue, 
unabhängige Ungarn so weit wie möglich auf seinem Weg zu einem stabilen Staat zu 
unterstützen. Der zweite Schwerpunkt liegt in Österreichs Weg zur EU Mitgliedschaft. Auch 
hier können wesentliche Positionsänderungen während dem Untersuchungszeitraum 
festgestellt werden. War Anfang des Jahres 1987 die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft noch undenkbar, so konnte sich Österreich bereits 1995 EU Mitglied nennen. 
Diese beiden Ereignisse werden anschließend mit dem Konzept der Securitization der 
Copenhagen School analysiert. Es wird untersucht, ob die Veränderung der Beziehung zu 
Ungarn und Österreichs EU Mitgliedschaft als Bedrohung gegen Österreichs Sicherheit 
formuliert wurden. Denn, so das Konzept, werden die Bedrohungen erfolgreich als solche 
formuliert ist es möglich außergewöhnliche Aktionen zu setzten, die eine Bekämpfung 
dergleichen erlauben. Es wird argumentiert, dass in beiden untersuchten Fällen eine 
teilweise securitization stattgefunden hat, da nicht alle Erfordernisse für ein erfolgreiche 
securitization vorliegen. Abschließend wird daher festgestellt, dass die nur teilweise 
securitization als positiv zu bewerten ist, denn eine vollständige securitization sagt aus, dass 
es nicht möglich war ein Problem innerhalb des normalen politischen Rahmens zu lösen. 
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10.2 Abstract English 
 
The present work outlines Austria’s foreign policy between 1987 and 1995. In this timeframe 
Dr. Alois Mock was Foreign Minister. This position allowed him to highly influence Austrian 
foreign policy. A closer look on Mock’s life and his political career is taken so one can 
understand the choices he made better. Two main historic events are the focus of the 
research period. First, the changing relation between Austria and Hungary is examined. At 
the beginning of Mock’s term as Foreign Minister these two countries were separated 
through the Iron Curtain, but after 1989 they were able to reestablish their friendly 
relations. Austria was very eager in supporting the new independent Hungary in becoming a 
stable country. Austria becoming a member of the EU is the second focus in this work. Again, 
substantial changes in positions can be detected in the investigation period. At the beginning 
of 1987 a membership was considered as not possible, but already in 1995 Austria could call 
itself a full member. These two events are further analyzed with the concept of 
securitization, which was developed by the Copenhagen School; whether the changing 
relations with Hungary or Austria’s EU membership were treated as existential threats to 
Austria’s security.  According to the concept, the use of extraordinary measures is allowed 
when an issue is seen as an existential threat. It is further argued, that only a partial 
securitization took place in both cases, because not all prerequisites according to the 
definition are fulfilled. In conclusion, it can be said that the partial securitization is positive, 
because it was possible to deal with the issues within the framework of normal politics.  
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